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Executive Summary 
Background 
‘Pre-experiencing’ as referred to throughout this document, looks at one 
aspect of future-directed thinking, that is, the quality of the cognitive representations 
and associated affect in the here-and-now whilst imagining a future event. It has been 
proposed that while imagining future events, individuals draw on episodic memory of 
experience, recombining and elaborating specific details that are re-experiences to 
simulate possible happenings (Schacter, Addis and Buckner, 2007). If this is the case, 
then it is possible that people with psychological disturbance may experience 
differences in pre-experiencing, as they often tend to have more negative beliefs about 
the self, others and the world, often based on their past experiences.  
Over-general memory (OGM) symbolises the tendency to retrieve more 
general past events referring to categories of similar events than specific ones relating 
to a singular event (Williams et al., 2007), with fewer sensory, time and place details. 
As our understanding of mental time travel has progressed to include that of future 
thinking, results have continued to show a consistent finding – that clinical groups, 
irrespective of the particular psychopathology, show reduced specificity in their future 
thinking. Numerous studies have looked at the relationship between specificity of 
future thought in depression and clinical groups with depression, but the results have 
been mixed. It is relevant to gain clarity of the current evidence base on specificity 
and depression, which forms the basis of Chapter 1, as reduced ability to form specific 
mental representations of the future may mean reduced ability and motivation to 
engage in goal directed behaviour that is often characteristic of people with mood 
disorders, which may in turn have impact on clinical work with this client group. 
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Whilst Chapter 1 aims to systematically review the evidence for reduced 
specificity of future thought in people with elevated depression, Chapter 2 presents an 
empirical study also investigating the quality of future thoughts but offers a novel 
contribution, that is, the emotional reactions to such thoughts about the future. Whilst 
the quantity of positive and negative future thoughts for people who are depressed has 
been looked at, as well as substantial literature on how people respond emotionally to 
events as they occur in depression, there has been little on the emotional response to 
anticipating such events.  
There are three views regarding how MDD might alter emotional reactivity as 
events occur, which may be applied to anticipated events and thus formed the closest 
parallel to base predictions upon in the present study. The negative potentiation 
hypothesis proposes that depressed individuals will exhibit potentiated, or heightened, 
emotional reactivity to negative emotional stimuli. The second hypothesis is positive 
attenuation, where depressed individuals’ low positive mood (as demonstrated in 
typical symptoms such as anhedonia, fatigue, apathy and behavioural inactivity) is an 
indicator that they are likely to show attenuated, or reduced, emotional reactivity to 
positive emotional stimuli. Finally, the third hypothesis is the emotion context 
insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis, which takes a more global view of emotional reactivity 
in depression, suggesting that such individuals will exhibit diminished reactivity to all 
stimuli, regardless of valence.   
Chapter 1: Systematic Review 
The aim of the systematic review was to determine whether depression is 
related to reduced specificity of future events by reviewing studies which compare 
adults with elevated depression to lower or non-depressed adult controls on a verbal 
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word cueing method of assessing specificity. An electronic literature search was 
conducted using two databases and articles were selected as eligible if they were in 
English, used a word or sentence completion cueing method, and comparing groups or 
using a dimensional design where the relationship of depression to specificity is 
examined within a cohort. The quality of included studies was assessed using a rating 
scale for non-randomised study designs. 
Twenty-three eligible studies were identified. The weight of the evidence 
suggested that yes, people with elevated depression do show reduced specificity when 
thinking about things that could happen to them in the future. Of the 23 papers 
included in the present systematic review, 14 found a significant relationship between 
depression and reduced specificity and of the studies who reported effect sizes, five 
found a large effect size and two a medium effect size. Different methods of coding 
specificity elicited similar results, adding weight to this conclusion. Of the ten studies 
who recruited from clinical populations, eight found significant effects between 
reduced specificity and elevated depression, compared to only three out of the eleven 
studies who reported using a community or student sample, further strengthening the 
relationship of reduced specificity in clinical levels of depression.  
The systematic review concludes that people with elevated depression do 
show less specific thoughts about the future. Future studies investigating the 
relationship between specificity of future thinking and depression may benefit from 
larger sample sizes and attention should be paid to the generalisability of findings 
based on cueing methodology, which should seek to represent everyday prospection 
as closely as possible. Future research and reviews could also look at moderators 
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which influence the strength of the relationship between depression and specificity in 
future thinking.  
Chapter 2: Empirical Study  
The empirical study employed a 2 x 2 mixed design to investigate whether 
there are differences between people who are experiencing dysphoric mood compared 
to controls in the cognitive representations of future events (that is, the quality of 
future thoughts) and the emotional reaction to thinking about these future events.   
Based on existing literature on how depression may alter emotional reactivity 
as events occur, the hypotheses suggested in the present study were that participants 
in the depressed group may score lower on pre-experiencing measures than controls 
and show reduced emotional reactivity to all cues in line with the emotion context 
insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis; they may show reduced emotional reactivity and pre-
experiencing for positive cues (positive attenuation hypothesis) and elevated 
emotional reactivity and pre-experiencing for negative cues (negative potentiation 
hypothesis).  
Fifty-four undergraduate students were given eight cue words (positive and 
negative, in the next few weeks and the next few years) using a standard cuing 
methodology for future-thinking as used in previous studies, and asked to imagine and 
describe specific events in the future that the word makes them think of. The 
cognitive representations or quality of future thoughts were measured using the 
future-directed Autobiographical Interview where event descriptions were segmented 
into unique bits of information which were subsequently coded as internal (detailed in 
time, place, sensory information) or external (semantic, repetitions or general 
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information not directly related to the event); and by four questions on the 
Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire (PCQ) asking participants to rate 
how much the felt they ‘pre-experienced’ and travelled forward in time to the event, 
how vivid and difficult to imagine it was. The emotional response to imagining future 
events was also measured in two ways – by collecting an ‘in-the-moment’ affect 
rating on four mood states (happy, relaxed, anxious, sad) and by two questions on the 
PCQ assessing presence of emotions expected to occur at the event (anticipated 
emotions) intensity of positive or negative emotions in the here and now whilst 
imagining the future event (anticipatory emotions).  
Dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups were created based on their scores on a 
self-report depression measure (PHQ-9). A score of 10 or more indicated the presence 
of depressive symptomology (n=25), and a score of 9 or less represented participants 
in the control group (n=29). There were no significant differences between groups 
with regards to the extent to which participants felt they pre-experienced the event, 
the extent they felt they travelled forward to the event, how vivid the event was, and 
how difficult the event was to imagine. However there was a significant difference 
between groups on the intensity of the emotions experienced when imagining the 
future events, with dysphoric participants experiencing more negative emotions than 
controls when thinking about the future events. In a similar vein, on the here and now 
mood ratings there were significant differences between groups on how happy they 
felt after imagining the events, indicating participants in the dysphoric group felt less 
happy than the control group after describing future events, after controlling for any 
initial variations in baseline happiness; and how relaxed they felt, indicating 
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participants in the dysphoric group rated themselves as less relaxed, and more 
anxious. There were no significant differences on ratings of ‘sad.’  
Whilst the findings of this study suggest there are no differences between 
people with or without low mood in the cognitive representations of future events, 
there were in the emotional response to thinking about the future. It was found that 
people who are even mildly depressed benefit less emotionally when thinking about 
things that could happen to them in the future. However, given high comorbidity it 
was not possible to partial out the effects of anxiety and this should be taken into 
account when interpreting results.  
Chapter 3: Integration, Impact and Dissemination 
The systematic review findings that people with elevated depression do show 
less specific thoughts about the future provided a conceptual basis for the empirical 
study and the proposed hypotheses. If people with more negative mood think about 
the future in more abstract, and less detailed ways, one would expect the same pattern 
in their ability to pre-experience – that the cognitive feelings, or ‘autonoetic 
consciousness’ of possible future events would also be harder to imagine and less 
vivid. Although the dysphoric group did not show differences in the cognitive 
representations, or quality, of their future thoughts in comparison to controls in the 
empirical study, there were differences in the emotional response. 
This finding is interesting, because predominant cognitive models of 
depression emphasise the powerful role that cognition plays in affecting mood 
(Coombs, Coleman & Jones, 2002), that is, faulty cognition leads to depressed mood. 
Miranda and Persons (1988) mood-state hypothesis, proposes that dysfunctional 
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beliefs are vulnerability factors for depression but that reporting of the beliefs varies 
with current mood state, so when in a negative mood state, people readily endorse 
dysfunctional beliefs, but when they are in a positive mood state, people do not report 
dysfunctional beliefs. Teasdale (1983) supports the view that perhaps mood states 
precede dysfunctional thinking. The increased accessibility of negative memories 
during negative mood states (and decreased accessibility of positive memories) may 
mean that a person is likely to make gloomy predictions about the future when 
depressed, which fits with Schacter et al.’s (2007) constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis but taking a more emotion focused than belief focused stance.  
The systematic review identified that studies where participants (although in 
the elevated depression group) did not meet clinical cut off scores for depressive 
symptomology or were recruited from community or student samples were less likely 
to find an effect for reduced specificity. It is possible that depressive symptomology 
in the present empirical study were not severe enough to demonstrate a significant 
difference in the cognitive representations, or quality, of future thoughts. A clinically 
depressed sample may then demonstrate both, differences in cognitive representations 
as well as the emotional reactions to thinking about the future.  
The findings of the empirical study have implications for clinical practice in 
that it may be that eliciting emotional expression in treatment sessions may be 
important. It has been argued that cognitive behavioural therapy tends to steer away 
from emotional experiencing in sessions in favour of focusing upon cognitive 
distortions as a way of reducing negative affect and behaviour (Coombes et al., 2002). 
Cognitive behavioural therapy already targets prospection through its focus on goal 
setting and behavioural activation to make future change and engage in future events. 
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Feeling heightened negative emotions when thinking about future stressful and/or 
negative events and reduced expectations of the success of positive outcomes may 
mean more emphasis on emotional expression related to thinking about future goals 
may be an important clinical aspect to focus on, and subsequent problem solving and 
planning needs to take place to help reduce some of these emotions. Future-directed 
therapy (FDT) has already been introduced as a way of alleviating depressive 
symptomology and hypothesises that when people feel, they have the power to thrive 
by creating a desired future state and obtain what is wanted, and focuses on emotions 
as indicators of thought processes rather than the other way round, and has been found 
effective in reducing depressive symptomology. 
 In order to achieve the clinical impact described above, it is important that the 
findings of this research are disseminated to appropriate forums. A target journal to 
submit the empirical study for publication is ‘Consciousness and Cognition,’ an 
international journal which focuses on a natural science approach to the issues of 
consciousness, voluntary control, and self. The empirical study may form a 
foundation for future research with a clinically depressed sample.  
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Chapter 1: Systematic Review 
Do people with elevated depression show less specific thoughts about the future?  
 
Abstract 
Specific future thoughts are characterised by possible events that are located in 
a particular time and place, and involve the generation of vivid information about that 
particular event (Hallford et al., 2018). Research has consistently shown that clinical 
groups, irrespective of the particular psychopathology, demonstrate reduced 
specificity in their future thinking. The aim of this systematic review is to determine 
whether depression is related to reduced specificity of future events by reviewing the 
studies comparing those with elevated depression (regardless of clinical diagnostic 
group) to those with lower or no depressive symptomology on specificity of future 
thinking, or prospection. Twenty-three studies eligible for inclusion were identified 
following a search of two databases. The quality of included studies was assessed 
using a rating scale for non-randomised study designs. It was concluded that the 
studies reviewed provide evidence that people with elevated depression levels do 
show reduced specificity when thinking about the future, particularly with higher, 
clinical levels of depressive symptomology. It is recommended that future studies 
investigating this relationship may benefit from larger sample sizes, and attention 
should be paid to the generalisability of findings based on cueing methodology, which 
should seek to represent everyday prospection as closely as possible. Future research 
and reviews could also look at moderators which influence the strength of the 
relationship between depression and specificity in future thinking.  
Key Words: Specificity, Future-Directed Thinking, Depression, Adults, Word Cueing 
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Introduction 
 
Episodic Future Thinking 
Thinking about the future is an integral component of human cognition, and is 
an area that has accelerated during recent years in the fields of cognitive, clinical and 
neuropsychological research (Michaelian, Klein & Szpunar, 2016). Although there are 
many ways in which humans think about the future (Schacter, Benoit & Szpunar, 
2017) research on thinking about the future has often focused on the simulation of 
future events, also talked about as episodic future thinking. Episodic simulation is the 
construction of a detailed mental representation of a specific autobiographical future 
event (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008) or the ability to project ourselves forward 
in time to pre-experience an event (Atance & O’Neill, 2001).  
Literature on episodic memory helps inform the understanding of episodic 
future thinking. According to Tulving (2002), episodic memory allows us to engage in 
mental time travel from the present to the past, enabling us to re-experience through 
autonoetic awareness. Autonoetic consciousness can be considered as what it is that 
gives us the phenomenal flavour of re-experiencing something (Tulving, 1985), 
allowing us to remember the sense of self in previous events at which we were present 
(Gardiner, 2001). This is in comparison to just knowing, or semantic memory. For 
instance, knowing the name of the park next to the house you used to live in relies 
upon semantic memory, whereas remembering a specific event that took place in that 
park, such as playing football with friends requires episodic memory. 
Tulving later proposed that the systems that underlie episodic memory also 
enable humans to project to self-relevant events that could happen in the future, thus 
allowing us to engage in ‘mental time travel’ into the future as well as the past. 
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Findings in the last decade or so have continued to support Tulving’s original 
proposition that episodic memory and episodic future thinking may involve similar 
processes, or represent two sides of a single overarching capacity (Szpunar & 
Radvansky, 2016; Hassabis, Kumaran & Maguire, 2007). Research has indicated 
other similarities between recalling our personal pasts and imagining personal futures. 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) found similarities in the phenomenal 
(sensory and contextual) characteristics of past and future events, where 
representations of positive events contain more sensory details and are clearer 
concerning time information, whilst also associated with a greater feeling of re-
experiencing (or pre-experiencing), compared to  representations of negative events. 
They also found temporally closer past and future events to have the same effect than 
more distant past or future events.  
Schacter and Addis (2007) put forward the constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis to explain the processes underlying the similarities between remembering 
the past and imagining the future. Episodic memory allows the retrieval of stored 
information about past events and experiences by extracting and recombining it into a 
simulation of a novel event (Schacter, 2012). By utilising past information in a 
flexible manner, future scenarios can be simulated without having to engage in the 
actual behaviours, highlighting its adaptive nature (Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
Differences in how people think about the past versus how they think about 
the future have also been identified. Berntsen and Bohn (2010) suggest these 
differences can be summarised into two main findings – that episodic future thinking 
requires more constructive effort, and that it is more emotionally positive than 
episodic remembering. The first can be demonstrated in brain imaging studies where 
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future-thinking appears to involve a wider neural network, likely to be due to the 
increased cognitive processing required to think of things that have not yet happened 
(Addis et al., 2007). Research has also indicated that people think about the future in 
more abstract and less detailed ways (MacLeod, 2016), specifically demonstrating 
fewer sensory details as well as less specific in time and place (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2004; Addis et al., 2008).  
Episodic Future Thinking and Specificity of future thought 
As mentioned above, people generally tend to be less specific about events in 
the future in comparison to events from the past. Specificity refers to the simulation of 
events that occur in a defined place and time, and relates to episodic detail, which 
refers to the number of contextual details about a specific event (Hallford, Austin, 
Takano & Raes, 2018). Over-general memory (OGM) describes the tendency to 
retrieve more general past events referring to categories of similar events than specific 
ones relating to a singular event (Williams et al., 2007). In line with evidence 
suggesting overarching processes in remembering and prospection, those who exhibit 
OGM tend to also show reduced specificity when simulating future events (Addis, 
Hach & Tippet, 2016). Specific future thoughts are characterised by possible events 
that are located in a particular time and place, and involve the generation of vivid 
information about that particular event (Hallford et al., 2018). For example, when 
instructed to think about an upcoming event such as graduation, one might vaguely 
think about how that is a likely possibility in the future. By thinking about the time of 
day, location, other contextual details such as details of the surroundings and sensory 
details such as how it feels to be there, temperature of the room and so on, this future 
thought becomes a specific episodic future thought.  
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But why is specificity and episodic future thinking important? According to 
Schacter et al. (2017), clinical studies support the notion that episodic future thinking 
serves a range of functions, including decision making, emotion regulation, intention 
formation and planning. According to Taylor, Pham, Rifkin & Armor (1998), mental 
simulations support planning and problem solving because they include specific 
information about people, places and social roles which help generate solutions to 
problems and by simulating the process needed to reach a goal, mentally rehearsing 
the steps needed to achieve it leads to appropriate changes in behaviour and thus 
increases the likelihood of that goal being achieved. Taylor et al. (1998) argue that 
simulations produce links to action by virtue of the self-regulatory activities they 
evoke, and make reference to athletes who improve performance via mental imagery 
and practice. In addition, several studies have also shown that episodic future thinking 
can enhance the ability to remember to carry out an intended activity, or prospective 
memory, as simulation may increase the probability that the intended action is 
triggered when the future event is encountered (Schacter, 2012).  
Different methods and paradigms for measuring specificity in future thinking 
have been utilised. Some studies use generic word cues such as common nouns such 
as ‘beach’ to elicit events (Williams et al., 1996; Dickson & Bates, 2006); whilst 
others use event based cues such as ‘New Year’s Eve’ to elicit possible future events 
(Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Wincour & Moscovitch, 
2002). In addition to single cue words, specificity tasks often use sentence stems. 
Raes et al., (2007) developed the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 
(SCEPT) which has been adapted by Anderson and Dewhurst (2009) into the SCEFT, 
to tap into prospection. This involved sentence steps which probe into thoughts 
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relating to the past or future, and participants can complete the sentence in any way, 
as long as each is unique (Anderson, Boland and Garner, 2016). 
Events are commonly rated as specific on three point scales of specific (e.g. 
my husband might compliment me next week when I get my hair cut), intermediate 
(someone might tell me I’ve lost weight), or general (a friend could compliment me) 
or if they contain sufficient details, such as ‘I am at the beach with my best friend, it is 
late in the afternoon and we are playing in the sand’ compared to ‘I’m at the beach.’ 
Other studies score specificity based on the type of detail provided, for instance if the 
event description contains time, place and sensory details the specificity score would 
be higher the more detail provided. For example, “I am at the beach in Bournemouth, 
with my best friend, it is 4 o’clock in the afternoon and I can see the sun shining and 
hear people laughing next to me.”  
Episodic Future Thinking, Specificity and Psychopathology  
Over-general memory has been found in emotional disorders. In their review, 
Williams et al., (2007) found over general memory to be a consistent characteristic of 
patients diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder, in 11 studies with a large effect 
size (Cohen’s d = 1.12). Several studies have shown links between reduced specificity 
and psychological disorder. Initial research spanning back 30 years or so indicated 
that different forms of psychopathology are associated with a reduced ability to recall 
specific autobiographical memories (Boelen, Huntjens & van den Hout, 2014), first 
observed by Williams and Broadbent in their 1986 study with suicidal patients.  
As our understanding of mental time travel has progressed to include that of 
future thinking, results have continued to show a consistent finding – that clinical 
groups, irrespective of the particular psychopathology, show reduced specificity in 
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their future thinking. Reduced specificity has been found in schizophrenia (de 
Oliveira Cuervo-Lombard, Salame & Danion, 2009; Chen et al., 2016). Raffard, 
Esposito, Boulanger and Van der Linden (2013) similarly found that schizophrenia 
patients’ pleasant and unpleasant imagined future events were less specific and 
contained fewer phenomenal characteristics, and that these difficulties imagining 
pleasant future events was associated with apathy, which may underlie motivational 
deficits often seen in this client group. Reduced specificity has also been found in 
bipolar disorder (King et al., 2011; Boulanger, Lejune & Blairy, 2013); post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Kleim et al., 2014); and developmental disorders such as Autism 
(Lind & Bowler, 2010; Crane, Lind & Bowler, 2013). 
Episodic Future Thinking, Specificity and Depression  
Depression is a common mental disorder, and one of the main causes of 
disability worldwide affecting an estimated 300 million people (WHO, 2017). 
According to the DSM-V, Major Depressive Disorder is characterised by depressed 
and/or diminished interest and pleasure in activities most of the day. Other common 
symptoms (five or more to meet criteria) include weight gain or loss, sleep 
difficulties, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness and diminished ability 
to concentrate. Some may also experience recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal 
ideation. The symptoms experienced cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in functioning whether social, occupational or others (American 
Psychological Association, 2013).  
Depressive symptomology has commonly been shown to be elevated in other 
clinical diagnostic groups with an estimated 50% rate of comorbidity in 
schizophrenia, (Buckley, Miller, Lehrer & Castle, 2009); between 30-50% in those 
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with post-traumatic stress disorder (Campbell et al., 2007); and in as many as 50% in 
those with an anxiety disorder, presenting in the community (Kessler et al., 1996) and 
up to 75% in those presenting with anxiety disorders in primary care settings 
(Hirschfield, 2011).  
Numerous studies have looked at the relationship between specificity of future 
thought in depression and clinical groups with depression, but the results have been 
mixed. Some have shown there is a relationship between reduced specificity of future 
thought and depressive symptomology (King, MacDougall et al., 2011; Dickson & 
Moberly, 2013; Hach, Tippet & Addis, 2014), whilst others have found proportions of 
specific and over-general responses not to be significantly associated with concurrent 
depression (MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; Boelen et al., 2014). These studies have used 
various different methodology and samples, and so it is important to gain a consensus 
of the state of the evidence base, as considered in the present review. 
Episodic Future Thinking, Specificity and Depression – Why is it relevant? 
Earlier in this chapter we have considered the adaptive value of specific 
episodic future thinking in helping to plan, problem solve, form action and engage in 
goals. It has long been known that people with depression tend to have a more 
hopeless and negative outlook of the future, the world around them and themselves 
(Beck, 1967). People with depression have shown reduced ability to form and take the 
steps required to achieve goals (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004), and are more pessimistic 
regarding the likelihood of achieving their goals compared to never depressed 
individuals (Dickson, Moberly, & Kinderman, 2011). Reduced ability to form specific 
mental representations of the future may therefore mean reduced ability and 
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motivation to engage in goal directed behaviour that is often characteristic of people 
with mood disorders.  
Objectives of this Systematic Review 
The purpose of this systematic review is to find and evaluate studies 
comparing those with elevated depression to those with lower or no depressive 
symptomology on specificity of future episodic thinking.  The aim is to determine 
whether depression is related to reduced specificity of future events.  
The review also focuses on adult samples rather than younger or older people. 
Older adults have been shown to communicate in a more general way than do young 
adults, so reduced specificity may not be because of differences in episodic memory 
mechanisms but because of general differences in descriptive ability and narrative 
style (Schacter & Madore, 2016).  
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Method 
The review was conducted with reference to the PRISMA guidelines for 
reporting systematic reviews (Liberati et al., 2009). 
Information Sources and Search Strategy 
An electronic literature search was conducted using two databases, PsycINFO 
and Web of Science. The search included all articles written in English and published 
up until the date of the literature search on 5
th
 November 2017. The search terms used 
for the titles and abstracts in the databases were as follows: 
Future OR Future thinking OR future-thinking OR future-directed thinking OR 
thinking about the future OR prospection AND specific* AND depress* OR anx* OR 
schizophrenia OR bipolar OR PTSD OR post-traumatic stress disorder OR trauma.  
The full search string is presented in Appendix 1. Once the initial search 
results were retrieved, duplicates were removed. The remaining titles and abstracts 
were screened for eligibility and subsequently the full texts of a smaller number of 
articles were assessed for suitability for inclusion in this review. Additional relevant 
articles were sourced and assessed by scanning the reference lists of already identified 
eligible articles. Due to time and resource constraints, this literature search focused on 
published journal articles only.  
Eligibility and Study Selection 
A predefined list of criteria was compiled to determine which articles would 
be eligible to be included in this review. Firstly, they needed to be accessible in the 
English language. Secondly, specificity of thought should be measured using a word 
cueing or sentence completion paradigm where response were coded for specificity.  
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Where the article addressed both, future thinking and memory, only information 
related to specificity of future thinking was extracted. Thirdly, in order to be eligible 
articles could either be categorical in design, whereby specificity is compared 
between a group of participants with elevated depression and a control group of non-
depressed or lower-depressed participants, or dimensional in design where the 
relationship of depression to specificity is examined within a cohort. Articles were 
eligible even if the primary diagnostic criteria were not specifically depression, as 
long as there was evidence that the clinical group had significantly elevated levels of 
depression. Lastly, depressive symptom severity could be evidenced by either a 
structured clinical interview to assess individuals meeting the diagnostic criteria for 
major depression according to the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
2013), or by self-reported elevated levels of depression using validated 
questionnaires. Studies were excluded if they used the same sample (or were a 
duplicate) of another eligible study.  
Data Extraction 
Data were extracted on the following characteristics using a predefined data 
extraction form: 
 Author and year 
 Study design (categorical vs dimensional) 
 Sample size 
 Sample characteristics (age, gender) 
 Recruitment source(s) for sample 
 Main method and/or measures used to assess presence of clinical disorder 
and/or elevated depression levels 
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 Method of assessing specificity of future thought and scoring of outcomes 
 Key findings relevant to the review question 
Table 1 presents the characteristics of each study included in this review. Due 
to time constraints, the data were extracted independently by the author only.  
Quality Assessment  
The quality of included studies was assessed using a rating scale for non-
randomised study designs. This rating tool was taken from Everaert, Podina and 
Koster’s (2017) meta-analysis on interpretation biases in depression, and is an adapted 
version of the Checklist for Measuring Quality by Downs and Black (1998). This 
scale consists of 18 items, assessing the reporting of participant characteristics, 
representativeness of the sample, validity and reliability of outcome measures, 
attention to potential confounders, accuracy of reported findings and study power 
(Appendix 2). Each item is rated on a two-point scale, where 0 indicates no or unable 
to determine answers; and 1 indicates yes, the item criteria for quality has been met. 
Question 11 on the rating tool allows the criteria to be partially met, in which case this 
was scored was given as 0.5, and those fully meeting the criteria were scored as 1. 
Higher scores indicate greater quality. Due to time and resource constraints, quality 
ratings were carried out independently by the author.  
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Results 
Figure 1 demonstrates the process by which papers were selected for inclusion 
in this review. The initial search generated a combined 723 papers, where 105 
duplicates were removed using referencing software. Following this, the titles and 
abstracts of the remaining 618 papers were screened for eligibility and a total of 56 
were identified as potentially eligible for inclusion. Once the full texts of these papers 
were cross referenced against the inclusion criteria, 21 were judged as suitable. An 
additional two papers were identified from scanning the reference lists of these 21 
papers, resulting in a total number of 23 papers included in the review. One paper had 
two studies within it, using different samples and so has been split into Experiment 1 
and 2. 
Figure 1: Flowchart of the study selection process
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Characteristics of the included studies  
Table 1 presents the characteristics based on extracted data for the 23 eligible 
papers in this review. The mean age of participants across the included studies ranged 
from 19.4 years to 52.16 years, and the proportion of female participants ranged from 
8% to 100%.  
Study Design 
The majority (19) of reviewed studies used an independent design, involving a 
clinical group with elevated depression levels and a comparison control group with 
lower or no depressive symptomology reported. The sample size for these studies 
ranged from 28 to 72. The remaining four studies used a correlational design whereby 
there was one sample and depression was measured on a continuum, and the sample 
size for these studies ranged from 82 to 183.  
Measures and Assessment of Depression 
Of the 23 papers included in this review, 11 focused specifically on depression 
(Depression n = 9; Dysphoria n = 2) and two on Suicidal patients. The remaining 10 
papers focused on PTSD (n = 4); Bipolar Disorder (n = 2), Complicated Grief (n = 2), 
Schizophrenia (n = 1) and anxiety (n= 1), all of which also provided evidence of 
significantly elevated levels of depression in the clinical group.  
Three of the studies included in this review utilised a formal clinical diagnosis 
established using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV alongside self-report 
measures. Three studies utilised the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D, 
Hamilton, 1960) which is also clinician rated. The remaining 17 utilised self-report 
measures of depression. Six of the studies using self-report measures established cut 
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off scores to distinguish between depressed and control groups.  The remaining 11 
reported the clinical group to have elevated depression scores in comparison to the 
control group.  The elevated depression group in two of the independent design 
studies (although higher than the control group) scored below the typical clinical cut 
off criteria (Brown et al., 2013; D’Argembeau, Raffard & Van der Linden, 2008), thus 
indicating very low presence of depressive symptoms, and two of the correlational 
studies also indicated mean depression scores were subclinical (Boelen et al., 2014; 
Szollosi, Pajkossi & Racsmany, 2015).
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 Table 1 
Characteristics of studies included in the systematic review 
Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
Addis et al. 
(2016)* 
Categorical 48 D: 88 
C: 84 
 (M) 
D:25 
C:24 
(M) 
Australia 
students 
MDD BDI-II Any history 
of MDD  
Modified 
AMT  
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
14 
Anderson et al. 
(2016) 
(Experiment 1) 
Categorical 61 D: 87 
C:81 
D:20.87 
C:20.29 
UK students Dysph. CES-D Cut off 16+ 
on CES-D 
SCEFT Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
11 
Anderson et al. 
(2016) 
(Experiment 
2)* 
Categorical 53 D:70 
C:50 
D:20.70 
C:20.12 
UK students Dysph. CES-D Cut off 16+ 
on CES-D 
E-SCEFT Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
11 
Belcher & 
Kangas (2014)* 
Categorical  60 D:70 
C:83 
D:38 
C:31 
Australia 
Community 
MDD SCID-IV  
BDI-II 
DSM-IV 
Diagnosis  
FIT Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
15 
Blix & Categorical 46 D: 100 D:25.59 Norway PTSD BDI Elevated FCT Proportion 11 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
Brennan (2011) C:100 C:24.18 Emergency 
& Crisis 
Centres; 
Community 
 
 
of specific 
responses 
Boelen et al. 
(2014) 
Dimensional 142 90 21.5 Dutch 
University 
from 
existing data 
MDD, 
OCD, 
PTSD, 
Anx. 
BDI-II 
 
Range of 
scores in 
single 
sample 
SCEFT Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
14 
Boulanger et 
al. (2013)* 
Categorical  38 D:58 
C:58 
(M) 
D:45.2 
C:45.4 
(M) 
Belgian 
Psychiatric 
Clinics & 
Community 
BD SCL-90-R 
SCID-IV 
Elevated Future 
AMT 
French 
Version 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
12 
Brown et al. 
(2013)* 
Categorical  28 D:8 
C:18 
D:30.25 
C:31.38 
American 
Combat 
Veterans  
PTSD BDI-II Elevated Future-
Oriented 
AI 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
 
12 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
D'Argembeau 
et al. (2008)* 
Categorical  32 D:56 
C:56 
(M) 
D:36 
C:30 
(M) 
French 
sample, 
source not 
specified 
Scz. BDI-II 
 
Elevated FCT 
French 
Versions 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
10 
Dickson & 
Bates (2006)* 
Categorical 34 D:88 
C:65 
D:20-24 
C:20-24 
University 
population, 
location not 
specified  
Dysph. BDI Cut off 16+ 
on BDI 
FET Three item 
ordinal 
rating of 
specificity 
11.5 
Dickson & 
Moberly (2013) 
Categorical  44 D:62 
C:71 
D:37.9 
C:31.2 
UK Primary 
Care & 
Mental 
Health 
Trusts; 
Community 
MDD SCID IV                                              
BDI-II 
Cut off 13+
on BDI 
Goal Task 
& coding                                                      
Goal 
Explanatio
n Task & 
coding 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
13 
Dickson et al. Dimensional 82 Unclear 27.3 UK Anx. BDI Range of Personal Three item 12.5 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
(2009) due to 
exclusi
ons 
University scores in 
single 
sample 
Event 
Cuing 
Task 
ordinal 
rating of 
specificity 
Hach et al. 
(2014)* 
Categorical 33 D:88 
C:88 
D:23.53 
C:20.63 
New 
Zealand, 
source 
unspecified  
MDD BDI-II 
  
Cut off 14+ 
on BDI 
Modified 
AMT 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
10 
King, 
MacDougall et 
al. (2011)* 
Categorical  44 D:68 
C:64 
(M) 
D:48 
C:45.1 
(M) 
Canadian 
Mood Clinic 
MDD HAM-D 
 
DSM-IV 
Diagnosis 
Cue Word 
Test 
Number of 
episodic 
details 
12 
King, Williams 
et al. (2011)* 
Categorical  40 D:60 
C:60 
(M) 
D:45.7 
C:45.4 
(M) 
Canadian 
Mood 
Disorders 
Clinic 
BD HAM-D 
 
Elevated Future 
Oriented 
AI 
Number of 
episodic 
details 
11 
Kleim, et al. Categorical  50 D:67 D:42.3 Community PTSD BDI                     Elevated AMT-f Proportion 13 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
(2014)  C:50 C:37 Assault & 
Vehicle 
Survivors 
 of specific 
responses 
Maccallum & 
Bryant (2011) 
Categorical  45 D:92 
C:86 
D:50.67 
C:50.76 
Australian 
Traumatic 
Stress Clinic 
& 
Community 
CG BDI-II 
 
Elevated FIT Three item 
ordinal 
rating of 
specificity 
12 
MacLeod & 
Cropley (1995) 
Categorical 44 D: 70 
C:58 
D:19.4 
C:19.7 
UK 
University  
Dysph. BDI Cut off 14+ 
on BDI 
Subjective 
Probability 
& 
Example 
Generation 
Task 
Number of 
specific 
responses 
11 
Parlar et al. Categorical  41  D:52 D:41.3 Canadian PTSD HAM-D DSM-IV Future Number of 13 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
(2016)  C:50 
(M) 
C:36.5 
(M) 
Healthcare 
Service 
SCID-IV MDD Oriented 
AI 
episodic 
details 
Robinaugh et 
al. (2013)  
Dimensional 170 79 Not 
reported 
American 
University & 
Community 
MDD, 
PTSD 
CES-D 
 
Range of 
scores in 
single 
sample 
SCEFT Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
11 
Robinaugh & 
McNally 
(2013)* 
Categorical  33 D:54 
C:40 
D:48.54 
C:52.16 
American 
Community 
CG CES-D 
 
Elevated FET Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
13 
Szollosi et al. 
(2015) 
Dimensional 183 74 25 Hungarian 
Community 
MDD BDI-13 Range of 
scores in 
single 
sample 
Cue Words 
MCQ 7 
item 
translated 
version 
Proportion 
of specific 
responses 
9 
Vincent et al. Categorical 48 D:63 D:40 UK A&E Parasu. HADS Elevated MEPGAP Proportion 
of specific 
11 
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Author (Year) Design Total 
n 
% 
female 
Mean 
Age 
Country 
and group 
Clinical 
Group 
Depression 
Measure 
Depression 
Status of 
CG 
Specificity 
Measure 
Specificity 
Scoring 
Method 
Quality 
Score  
(2004) C:63 
(M) 
C:40 
(M) 
Department  responses  
Williams et al. 
(1996) 
Categorical  72 D:67 
C1:63 
C2:67 
D:34 
C1:24 
C2:34 
UK Hospital 
& 
Volunteers 
MDD/O
D 
BDI 
 
Elevated FCT Three item 
ordinal 
rating of 
specificity 
11.5 
Note: * = study found an effect for reduced specificity in depression. C = Control Group, CG = Clinical Group, D = Diagnostic Group, (M) = Matched, AMT-f = 
Autobiographical memory test future version, Anx. = Anxiety, BD = Bipolar Disorder, BDI = Beck depression inventory, BDI-13 = Beck depression inventory 
shorter version, CES-D = Centre for epidemiological studies depression scale, CG = Complicated Grief, Dysph = Dysphoria, E-SCEFT = Sentence Completion for 
events from the future test, emotionally valenced, FCT = Future cueing task, FET = Future event task, FIT = Future imaginings test, HADS = Hospital anxiety and 
depression scale, HAM-D = Hamilton depression rating scale, MCQ = Memory characteristics questionnaire, MEPGAP = Measure to elicit positive future goals and 
plans, OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, OD = Overdose, Parasu = Parasuicide, PTSD = Post traumatic Stress Disorder, SCEFT = Sentence Completion for 
events from the future test, SCID-IV = Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV, SCL-90-R = Symptom checklist revised, Scz = Schizophrenia.   
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Eliciting Future Thought and Scoring Specificity 
There were several methods in which future directed thoughts were elicited in 
the studies included in this review, all of which involved a variation of a verbal cueing 
method. Table 2 presents the main characteristics of each method, alongside an 
indication of whether a relationship between reduced specificity and elevated 
depression was found. The studies in the table have been grouped together by cueing 
methodology.  
Autobiographical Interview – Future Version (F-AI) 
Four of the studies used a future directed version of the AI. This was 
originally developed by Levine et al., (2002) for autobiographical memories, and later 
adapted by Addis et al., (2008) for future directed thoughts. Participants are given 
single word cues and asked to generate a specific event that could realistically happen 
to them in the future. They are typically given three minutes to generate as much 
detail about the event as they can, which is audio recorded for later transcription. 
Once transcribed, each description is separated into segments or unique bits of 
information, which are subsequently coded as either internal or external. Internal 
details involve episodic, specific details related to time and place for example, whilst 
external details are semantic bits of information or repetitions. Scores are then tallied. 
The higher the internal score, the greater the specificity of the event. 
Of the four studies using the F-AI, three found that those in the clinical group 
(thus elevated depression) showed reduced specificity when thinking about future 
events. Parlar et al. (2016) found when comparing log transformed means for number 
of episodic and non-episodic details, there were no significant differences between the 
39 
 
groups but there was a medium effect size (d = .48) because those with MDD 
produced numerically fewer episodic details.  
Autobiographical Memory Test Future Version (AMT-F) 
Four studies used the AMT-F, however it tended to be modified in different 
ways. Typically, single word cues are given and participants have one minute to 
generate as much detail about a specific event as they can, which is audio-recorded 
and later transcribed. Hach, Tippett and Addis (2014) and Addis, Hach and Tippett 
(2016) used 24 event based cues rather than single words, because the events were 
being generated in a shorter time frame (20 seconds) to the usual one minute (due to 
participants undergoing fMRI at the same time), and event such as ‘New Year’s Eve’ 
were less abstract than single word cues and thus easier to generate. In terms of 
scoring, these two studies scored specificity on a four-point scale of specific 
(temporally and contextually, lasting no more than one day), categoric (repeatedly 
occurring events/routines), extended (lasting more than one day) or semantic 
information. The latter three represent non-specific detail. One of the other two 
studies scored specificity on a three-point scale of specific, categoric or extended, and 
the last scored it as events lasting less than one day.  
Of the studies utilising this method, three found that the clinical group (thus 
group with elevated depression) showed reduced specificity of future thoughts. 
Although Kleim et al., (2014) did not find a main effect for diagnostic group, they did 
find that those in the PTSD group produced fewer specific future events in response to 
positive cues than those without PTSD, and the effect size was medium. 
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Table 2 
Cueing Methods and Specificity Scoring 
Study Name of 
Cueing 
Method 
Type of 
Cue 
Number of 
Future 
Directed 
Cues 
Specificity Scoring Effect Found Effect 
Size 
       
Brown et al. 
(2013) 
Future AI Single 
Word 
10 Internal/External Detail Yes those with PTSD produced fewer 
internal details (F(1,26)=10.79, p=.003, 
n²=.29 
Large 
King, Williams 
et al. (2011) 
Future AI Single 
Word 
9 Internal/External Detail Yes those with BD produced 
significantly fewer internal details 
(t=3.41, df=38, p<.01) 
Not 
reported 
King, 
MacDougall et 
al. (2011) 
Future AI Single 
Word 
9 Internal/External Detail Yes those with MDD produced 
significantly fewer internal details (t42=-
3.45, p=<.01) 
Not 
reported 
Parlar et al., 
(2016) 
Future AI Single 
Word 
9 Internal/External Detail No did not reach significance  
Hach et al., 
(2014) 
AMT-F Event 
Based 
24 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
Yes depressed group had lower 
proportion of specific detail 
Large 
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Study Name of 
Cueing 
Method 
Type of 
Cue 
Number of 
Future 
Directed 
Cues 
Specificity Scoring Effect Found Effect 
Size 
(F(1,31)=8.93, p=.005, n²p=.224) 
Addis et al., 
(2016) 
AMT-F Event 
Based 
24 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
Yes depressed group generated lower 
proportion of specific events 
(F(1,46)=8.58, p=.005, n²=.16) 
Large 
Kleim et al., 
(2014) 
AMT-F Single 
Word 
12 Lasting less than 1 day, contextual No difference between groups (d = 0.57) Medium 
Boulanger et 
al. (2013) 
AMT-F Single 
Word 
10 Specific/Categoric/Extended Yes those with BD showed significant 
decrease in number of specific future 
events (F(1,33)=9.8, p=.003, n²=.23) 
Large 
Anderson et al. 
(2016) Exp 1 
SCEFT Sentence 11 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
No  
Anderson et al. 
(2016) Exp 2 
E-SCEFT Sentence 11 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
Yes dysphoric group produced 
significantly fewer specific events when 
cues were emotionally valenced 
(F(1,51)=10.38, p=.002, n²p=.17) 
Medium 
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Study Name of 
Cueing 
Method 
Type of 
Cue 
Number of 
Future 
Directed 
Cues 
Specificity Scoring Effect Found Effect 
Size 
Robinaugh et 
al. (2013) 
SCEFT Sentence 9 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
No  
Boelen et al. 
(2014) 
SCEFT Sentence 11 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
No  
Blix & 
Brennan (2011) 
FCT Single 
Word 
15 Specific/Categoric/Extended/ 
Semantic 
No  
D'Argembeau 
et al. (2008) 
FCT Single 
Word 
10 Specific/Categoric/Extended Yes those with schizophrenia reported 
less specific responses (F(1,30)=20.80, 
p<.001) 
Not 
reported 
Williams et al. 
(1996) 
FCT Single 
word in 
sentence 
15 Specific/Intermediate/General Yes overdose subjects were less specific 
than controls (F(1,70)=5.7, MSe = 1.60, 
p=.05) 
Not 
reported 
Dickson & 
Bates (2006) 
FET Single 
Word 
6 Specific/Intermediate/General Yes dysphoric individuals were less 
specific than controls (F(1,32)=58.70, 
p<.001, n²=.65) 
Large 
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Study Name of 
Cueing 
Method 
Type of 
Cue 
Number of 
Future 
Directed 
Cues 
Specificity Scoring Effect Found Effect 
Size 
Robinaugh & 
McNally (2013) 
FET Single 
Word 
8 Specific/General/Non-response Partially – individuals with CG were 
less specific only when events did not 
include deceased (t(31) = 4.48, p < .001)  
Not 
reported 
Belcher & 
Kangas (2014) 
FIT Single 
word & 
goals 
6 Specific/Intermediate/General Yes depressed sample were less specific 
in general & on goals (F(1,57)=8.23, 
p=.006, n²p=.126) 
Medium 
Maccallum & 
Bryant (2011) 
FIT Single 
word in 
sentence 
10 Specific/Intermediate/General Yes those with CG were less specific in 
imagining positive future events 
(t(40.55)52.57, p=<.015) 
Not 
reported 
Szollosi et al. 
(2015) 
Cue Word 
Test 
Single 
Word 
12 Specific/General No   
Dickson et al. 
(2009) 
Personal 
Event 
Task 
Single 
Word 
8 Specific/Intermediate/General No  
Dickson & Goal Task Goals As many in Specific/General Yes those with depression reported less Large 
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Study Name of 
Cueing 
Method 
Type of 
Cue 
Number of 
Future 
Directed 
Cues 
Specificity Scoring Effect Found Effect 
Size 
Moberly (2013) 90 seconds specific goals (F(1,43,=10.74, p=.002, 
n²p=.20 
MacLeod & 
Cropley (1995) 
Example 
Generatio
n Task 
Statement
s 
16 Specific/Intermediate/General No  
Vincent et al. 
(2004) 
MEPGAP Goals As many in 
60 seconds 
4 point scale on life domain, 
amount of detail and no need for 
sub goals 
Yes Parasuicide groups produced lower 
proportion of specific goals (t(46) = 
2.22, p<.05) 
Not 
reported 
AI = Autobiographical Interview, AMT-f = Autobiographical memory test future version, BD = Bipolar disorder, CG = Complicated grief, E-SCEFT = Sentence 
Completion for events from the future test, emotionally valenced, FCT = Future cueing task, FET = Future event task, FIT = Future imaginings test, MDD = Major 
depressive disorder, PTSD = Post traumatic stress disorder, SCEFT = Sentence Completion for events from the future test. 
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Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Task (SCEFT) 
The SCEFT is a version of the Sentence Completion for Events in the Past 
Task (SCEPT, Raes et al., 2007), adapted for future events by Anderson and 
Dewhurst (2009). This comprises sentence stems, such as “Next week I…” and 
participants are instructed to complete the stem. These sentence completions are then 
coded, into one of four categories, as previously mentioned – specific or categoric, 
extended, semantic. Three studies included in this review used this method to elicit 
future events. None of the studies using this method found a significant effect for 
specificity and elevated depression. However, in their second experiment, Anderson, 
Boland and Garner (2016) did find that when the sentence stems were emotionally 
valanced (E-SCEFT), dysphoric participants reported fewer specific events than 
controls, and there was a medium effect size. 
Future Cueing Task (FCT), Future Events Task (FET) & Future 
Imaginings Task (FIT) 
These methods are variations of the original Future Events Task by Williams 
et al., 1996. Participants are given positive and negative (and sometimes neutral) 
single cue words and asked to generate as much detail about a specific event that 
could happen to them in the future within a one-minute time frame. Three studies 
used a variation of this task. Blix and Brennan (2011) scored specificity of responses 
on a four-point scale as described above, whilst the remaining two studies utilised a 
three point scale of specific, extended or categoric; and specific (e.g. my husband 
might compliment me next week when I get my hair cut), intermediate (someone 
might tell me I’ve lost weight), or general (a friend could compliment me). Two 
studies used the FET and scored specificity on the three-point scale of 
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specific/moderate/general and specific/general/non response, and two studies used the 
FIT (scoring specificity on specific/moderate/general scales), both of which are very 
similar to the FCT.  
Two of the three studies using the FCT found that the clinical groups showed 
reduced specificity in future event descriptions. For those that used the FET, Dickson 
and Bates (2006) found a large effect size for dysphoric individuals being less specific 
than controls; whereas Robinaugh and McNally (2013) found this to be the case for 
people with complicated grief (compared to those without complicated grief) only if 
the future event being described did not involve the deceased. For the two studies that 
used the FIT, both found the group with elevated depression to be less specific in their 
event descriptions.  
Other methods for eliciting future directed thoughts 
The remaining five studies in this review used slightly different methods of 
eliciting future thoughts and or scoring specificity. Szollosi, Pajkossy and Racsmany 
(2016) presented participants with 10 positive and negative cue words and asked them 
to generate an event that could happen in one year’s time, following which they rated 
the phenomenal qualities. Following this, the descriptions were categorised as either 
specific or general. They did not find any relationship between depression scores and 
specificity.  
Dickson, Moberly and Hannon (2009) used a variant of the FET, but asked 
participants to write down four specific future events associated with different 
negative emotion cues. For example, “a future situation I can anticipate myself 
feeling…” The descriptions were then coded as specific, extended or categoric. A 
47 
 
total specificity score was calculated by summing the points for each of these three 
coding categories. They did not find any relationship between depression severity and 
specificity scores.  
MacLeod and Cropley (1995) first used a subjective probability task where a 
list of 16 positive and negative statements were given, and participants were required 
to estimate how likely they thought each item could happen to them in the future on a 
seven-point Likert scale. They then completed an example generation task, where 
they were given one minute to generate a specific example for each of the 16 
statements and a brief description of what it was. Specificity was scored in terms of 
the specific, moderate or general methods outlined previously. Although they found 
depressed participants provided more general examples to positive and negative cues, 
partial correlations indicated this was due to hopelessness rather than depression 
specifically.  
The remaining two studies focused on goals as a measure of future directed 
thinking. Dickson and Moberly (2013) provided cues to elicit approach goals (“in the 
future it will be important for me to…”) and avoidance goals (“in the future it will be 
important for me to avoid…”). They had 90 seconds to write down as many 
personally meaningful and plausible goals in each goal condition. Following this, 
participants were given prompts to elicit reasons for and against goal achievement in 
each goal condition. Again, they had 90 seconds to write down as many explanations. 
Goals were scored as specific if they described an explicit aim and made reference to 
at least one of the following – time, place or people. General goals were those that 
were abstract aspirations such as ‘to be happy.’ Specific goal explanations were those 
which gave more detail as to why the goal could/could not be achieved. They found a 
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large effect size indicating depressed participants reported less specific approach and 
avoidance goals. 
Vincent, Boddana and MacLeod (2004) also used a goal focus for future 
thinking. They devised the Measure for Eliciting Positive Future Goals and Plans 
(MEPGAP). Participants were asked to generate as many goals as they could for the 
coming year in one minute. They then did the same but in response to seven different 
life domain cues. The first two goals given in each category were then taken and 
participants rated how much control they had over achieving the goal on a seven-point 
Likert scale. A four-point coding scheme (unclear what each point represents) was 
used to score specificity of each goal. The authors found that the parasuicide group 
produced proportionately fewer specific plans than controls. They did produce less 
specific goals but this was confounded by group differences in employment status.   
Of the ten papers included in this review where depression was not the main 
group differentiator (but instead showed elevated levels of depression in another 
diagnostic group), six studies specifically investigated the relationship between 
depression scores on the chosen depression measure and specificity scores. Of these 
six studies, only one (King, Williams & MacDougall, 2011) found a significant effect 
indicating reduced specificity in the clinical group. This study was focused on bipolar 
disorder. Of the four that did not do a separate analysis on depression scores and 
specificity, all four found a significant effect between the clinical group with elevated 
depression scores and specificity.
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Quality Ratings of the included studies 
Table 3 presents the mean score across all papers included in this review for 
each question on the quality assessment tool. The total quality score for each paper is 
presented in Table 1. A full table of the scores for individual papers on each question 
on the quality rating tool are presented in Appendix 3.  
There were specific areas in terms of quality that were particularly low. In 
order to determine if those willing to participate were representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited, the proportion of those asked who agreed 
should be stated. Only six studies made this clear. In order to reduce bias, all 
participants in each group should be recruited from the same population. This was the 
case for 48% (n = 11) of the studies included in this review, but for 22% it was not 
made clear enough to determine. 96% of the studies also did not make it clear enough 
whether participants were recruited from a specific time frame, which resulted in a 
low quality score for this question. 83% of studies did not make it clear enough as to 
whether task engagement was assessed, and 96% did not report whether there were 
any withdrawals or dropouts, both of which may influence bias in reporting of results. 
Only two studies reported they carried out a power analysis, which again may 
influence results if studies are underpowered. Small sample size was frequently 
referred to as a limitation of studies included in the review. 
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Table 3 
Ratings for the adapted Checklist for Measuring Quality 
Item Question M SD 
1 Study hypothesis, aims and objectives described? 0.87 0.34 
2 Main outcomes described in introduction or method? 1.00 0.00 
3 Participant characteristics described? 0.96 0.21 
4 Contacted participants representative? 0.87 0.34 
5 Prepared participants representative? 0.26 0.45 
6 Participants recruited from the same population? 0.48 0.51 
7 Participants recruited over the same time? 0.04 0.21 
8 Measures and tasks clearly described? 1.00 0.00 
9 Main outcome measures valid and reliable? 1.00 0.00 
10 Task engagement assessed? 0.17 0.39 
11 Possible confounders considered, assessed and controlled 
for? 
0.63 0.46 
12 Appropriate statistical tests used? 1.00 0.00 
13 Main findings described clearly? 1.00 0.00 
14 Estimates of random variability provided in main outcome 
data? 
0.91 0.29 
15 Exact probability values reported? 0.57 0.51 
16 Withdrawals and dropouts reported? 0.04 0.21 
17 Data-dredging made clear? 1.00 0.00 
18 Sufficient power analysis provided? 0.09 0.29 
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation. Maximum score of 1.00 for each item. 
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Discussion 
Discussion on findings of this review 
The weight of the evidence suggests that yes, people with elevated depression 
do show reduced specificity when thinking about things that could happen to them in 
the future. Of the 23 papers included in the present systematic review, 14 found a 
significant relationship between depression and reduced specificity and of the studies 
who reported effect sizes, five found a large effect size and two a medium effect size.  
With regard to the measurement of specificity, two themes emerged, some 
studies coded events as either specific or not, thus distinguishing levels of specificity 
between events. For example, scoring events as specific, categorical, extended or 
general. Other studies looked at specificity within events, by calculating the number 
of episodic details, such as within the future directed AI. The different methodologies 
produced similar effects, thus adding weight to the conclusion that there is a 
relationship between reduced specificity of future thought and depression. 
However, there are some considerations that need to be taken into account. Of 
the studies included in this review that did not find an effect for reduced specificity in 
elevated depression, four of them used a sentence cueing paradigm. The only study 
using this paradigm to find supportive evidence for the review question had 
emotionally valenced sentence stems. One reason for this may be that the SCEPT 
(sentence completion for events in the past test) has been shown to yield a 
significantly higher proportion of over-general responses compared to the AMT, 
perhaps because it taps in to the way everyday events are recalled in everyday life, as 
opposed to single word cueing tasks (Raes et al., 2007). Following on from this, the 
SCEFT may be a more accurate measure in assessing habitual future thinking 
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(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009). Furthermore, Anderson, Boland and Garner (2016) 
suggest that when cues are particularly emotional (as were in the majority of studies 
included in this review), they may not provide a clear representation of everyday 
simulation, where cue types are situation dependent and extremely variable. 
Therefore, emotionally valenced cues may impact ease of generation of events as well 
as the type generated, which may explain why the study using emotionally valenced 
sentence stems was the only one of this method to find significant results.  
So, if the argument that single word cues (as used in the majority of these 
studies) possibly produce less specific responses by their nature as being further from 
everyday experience is to be accepted, then results where significant relationships 
between reduced specificity and elevated depression have been found may not be 
representative of real life experience.  
Within the studies investigated in this review, there were differences in the 
ways depression was measured. As mentioned previously, only three studies included 
a sample with clinically diagnosed depression. Of these three, two found reduced 
specificity in depression. The study which did not find a significant effect of this 
relationship was that by Parlar et al. (2016), who focused mainly on PTSD rather than 
depression. Of all the studies not primarily focused on depression, half of them found 
a significant effect of reduced specificity in the clinical group. However, four out of 
these five studies did not conduct specific analyses comparing scores on the self-
report depression measures with specificity scores, so it cannot be ruled out that other 
factors related to these clinical groups were also involved in producing a significant 
effect. Furthermore, in two of these studies focusing on other clinical groups (not 
depression specifically) although demonstrating elevated depression in comparison to 
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controls, participants still did not meet the clinical cut off scores for depressive 
symptomology but did find a significant effect of reduced specificity in the clinical 
group.  There were two studies where depression was the main focus that also had 
subclinical depression cut off scores and interestingly, these studies did not find a 
significant relationship between depression scores and reduced specificity. Taken 
together, this may either mean that again, other factors in clinical groups may 
contribute to reduced specificity or the latter two studies failed to find an effect 
because depressive symptomology was not severe enough to contribute to an inability 
to imagine specific future scenarios.  
In a similar vein, a number of studies in this review used student or 
community samples rather than clinical samples. In the past, the validity of studying 
depressed students as an analogue of clinical depression has been questioned, mainly 
whether the presentation of depression in student samples is similar enough to those 
clinically depressed (Vredenburg, Flett & Kramer, 1993). In this review, of the 10 
studies who reported recruiting from clinical populations, eight found significant 
effects between reduced specificity and elevated depression. Only three out of the 
eleven studies who reported using a community or student sample found this effect. 
This finding again strengthens the conclusion that reduced specificity is related to 
elevated depression, when it is at a clinical level. 
The quality ratings of the studies in this review were generally good. There 
was a clear indication of low quality on some aspects, particularly the lack of a power 
analysis. A number of the studies in this review reported small sample size being a 
limitation, however they did still find significant effects between reduced specificity 
and elevated depression. Effect sizes were not frequently reported, and given the 
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relatively small sample sizes in many of the studies in this review, significance testing 
alone can be misleading, and makes findings trickier to compare across studies.   
Recommendations for future 
Future studies investigating the relationship between specificity of future 
thinking and depression may benefit from larger sample sizes, clearer distinguishing 
between clinical and non-clinical groups with regard to depression severity and 
formal diagnosis. Attention should be paid to the generalisability of findings based on 
cueing methodology, which should seek to represent everyday prospection as closely 
as possible. Future research and reviews could also look at moderators which 
influence the strength of the relationship between depression and specificity in future 
thinking.  
Strengths and limitations of this review 
This review has helped to synthesis the evidence base for specificity of future 
thinking in people with elevated depression, and outlined some recommendations for 
future reviews. There are some limitations of this review that are important to note. 
Due to time and resource constraints, the search strategy and quality ratings were 
carried out by the author only. The inclusion and exclusion of studies and subsequent 
quality ratings were discussed with the supervisor for this review, however 
independent blind ratings were not carried out by a second person, in order to produce 
interrater reliability calculations for both extraction and quality ratings.  Time 
constraints also meant that authors of included studies were not contacted for missing 
information which may bias the quality ratings as they are then in part based on how 
well a study was written as opposed to carried out. Unpublished studies were not 
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sought for the purposes of this review, which may increase the likelihood of 
publication bias.  
It is also worth noting that a meta-analysis on psychopathology and specificity 
in future thinking was published (Hallford et al., 2018) whilst this review was being 
undertaken. Hallford et al., (2018) found an overall effect indicating individuals with 
a psychiatric disorder have significantly less specific and less detailed episodic future 
thoughts, but relevant to this review, sub-group analyses showed significant effects 
for depression (but not all diagnoses such as PTSD or complicated grief), consistent 
with the current findings. Importantly, the papers included in their review differed to 
those in the present review as they did not focus specifically on elevated depression in 
clinical groups, and therefore the present review arguably compliments the former 
rather than replaces or is replaced by it.  
Conclusions 
Overall, the studies reviewed here provide evidence that people with elevated 
depression levels do show reduced specificity when thinking about the future. Further 
research addressing some of the limitations outlined here would be beneficial to 
advancing the understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie prospection, 
and subsequently inform interventions for depression.  
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Chapter 2: Empirical Study  
Pre-experiencing the Future in Dysphoria: The role of anticipatory affect 
 
Abstract  
Pre-experiencing is the future-directed equivalent of re-experiencing. The 
present study aims to investigate whether there are differences in how people with 
dysphoria think about the future in terms of cognitive feelings, that is, autonoetic 
consciousness, and emotional feelings. A sample of 54 undergraduate students 
(dysphoric mood n =25; non-dysphoric controls n=29) participated in a future-
directed Autobiographical Interview, where they were presented with positively and 
negatively valenced single word cues to which they described related possible future 
events they could be involved in, either within the next few months or next five years. 
Following each cue word, the quality of the cognitive representations of events were 
measured in two ways – by rating the phenomenological characteristics of the event 
they described and by coding the events for the number of episodic (internal) details, 
with a higher internal score indicating a richer description of the event. Emotional 
responses to thinking about future events were measured using an ‘in-the-moment’ 
affect measure on four mood states (happy, relaxed, anxious and sad) and ratings on 
intensity of positive and negative emotions.  
Results indicated that there were no differences in the qualities of cognitive 
representations people with dysphoria had about the future compared to controls, but 
they benefit less emotionally, that is, they have more negative and less positive 
anticipatory emotions. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed, 
lending support for mood-state hypotheses suggesting mood states precede 
dysfunctional thinking, in comparison to more recent predominant cognitive models 
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which emphasise the powerful role cognition plays in affecting mood. This highlights 
implications for clinical practice, particularly the importance of eliciting emotional 
expression in therapy sessions, related to thinking about future goals, with 
engagement in problem solving and planning to subsequently reduce negative 
emotions about the future.      
Key Words: Pre-experiencing, Future-Directed Thinking, Dysphoria, Depression, 
Anticipatory Emotions, Word Cueing, Future-Directed Autobiographical Interview, 
Phenomenological Characteristics 
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Introduction 
Pre-experiencing: A definition and functional qualities 
Pre-experiencing is the future-directed equivalent of re-experiencing. ‘Pre-
experiencing’ as referred to in this study looks at one aspect of future-directed 
thinking (or prospection as it is sometimes referred to), which is how the person feels 
in the here-and-now whilst imagining a future event, whether positive or negative.  
There are other cognitive and motivational aspects of future-directed thinking, such as 
probability estimates, goal setting, planning, and so on, which are not in competition 
with the view being taken here, but rather describe different facets of future-thinking.  
In the general population, episodic future thinking (EFT), or prospection, which is 
thinking about potential personal future experiences, constitutes a substantial portion 
of cognitive activity.  
There are two key processes involved in future-directed thinking that are 
central to the present study. As well as sensory-perceptual qualities, episodic future 
thoughts (EFT’s) are accompanied by ‘cognitive feelings’ including autonoetic 
consciousness, or the sense of pre-experiencing the event in some way in the here and 
now (Rebetez, Barsics, Rochat, D’Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2016).  Cognitive 
representations of future events give the flavour of its vividness in imagination, the 
extent to which a person feels it is happening to them and the level of detail in the 
imagined event. The other aspect of future-directed thinking relevant to the present 
study is the emotional reaction to thinking about those future events. Barsics, Van der 
Linden & D’Argembeau (2016) distinguish between anticipatory and anticipated 
emotions. Anticipatory emotions are those experienced in the present in response to 
the prospect of future events, whilst anticipated emotions on the other hand, are 
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emotions that are expected to be experienced in the future, if and when the imagined 
events occur. 
As mentioned previously, pre-experiencing influences one’s beliefs about 
what might happen in the future and allows us to plan accordingly, which in turn 
influence one’s decisions and actions, improving coping and goal-directed behaviour. 
For instance, Rebetez et al. (2016) found that when asking 103 undergraduate students 
to project themselves into possible future events and to rate the amount of sensory 
perceptual details and autonoetic consciousness associated with their representations, 
episodic future-thinking was associated with procrastination. The results suggested 
that procrastination is related to difficulties in simulating future events, as reflected by 
poor mental representations of imagined events (i.e., less vivid, with fewer details 
concerning places, people, and objects); and in particular with procrastination-related 
decision making abilities and procrastination-related motivational dispositions. 
Schacter, Addis and Buckner (2007) propose the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis that posits that while imagining future events, individuals draw 
on episodic memory of experience, recombining and elaborating specific memory 
details that simulate possible happenings (King, MacDougall, Ferris, Herdman, & 
McKinnon 2011). If this is the case, then it is possible that people with mental 
disorders may experience differences in pre-experiencing or prospection, as they often 
tend to have more negative beliefs about the self, others and the world, often based on 
their past experiences.  
 
 
60 
 
Pre-experiencing and the valence of thoughts 
If imagining the future as described above is constrained by past experiences 
amongst other factors, then factors that influence the qualitative aspects of memory, 
such as the valence of an event should also affect representations of future events. 
Some studies suggest that the positive or negative valence of information may indeed 
influence future-oriented thinking (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Studies 
have shown there are differences between past and future mental time travel with 
regard to the emotional content of events and the effects of emotion on the 
phenomenological characteristics of events. Future events generated by individuals 
tend to be more emotionally positive and idyllic than recollections of past events. 
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2013) asked 158 participants to remember one positive and 
one negative event from their past, and imagine a positive and negative event from 
their personal future, and events generated were then rated on their phenomenological 
characteristics, such as how vivid it was and how much they felt they travelled back 
or forward in time.  Findings from Rasmussen and Berntsen (2013) indicated that 
positive events were more phenomenologically vivid than negative events, and this 
was more pronounced for future thoughts than past ones; thus supporting the idea that 
future mental time travel is biased by uncorrected positive illusions, but past mental 
time travel is constrained by the reality of events that have actually happened.  
Additional evidence for distinguishing between past and future directed 
thinking in the context of valence comes from Newby-Clark and Ross (2003), who 
found that extremely positive events were described for both past and future events, 
but extremely negative events were only found in the past events condition. 
Furthermore, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) provided participants with 
61 
 
positive and negative cue words and asked them to retrieve recent and distant 
memories, as well as events that could happen in the close and distant future. They 
found that for both memories and future directed thought, close events compared to 
distant events, and positive as opposed to negative events, were rated as having more 
sensory details and a stronger feeling of being experienced when they were thought 
about. There are functional and adaptive consequences of picturing a more positive 
future. For instance, it may encourage an individual to seek out new opportunities 
despite the possible risks of failure or disappointment (Taylor & Brown, 1988).  
The valence of future directed thinking has also been looked at in individuals 
with mood disorders, and show contrasting results in comparison to the evidence on 
more idyllic future representations. For example, MacLeod & Byrne (1996) provided 
anxious participants, mixed anxious and depressed participants, and controls with an 
adapted verbal fluency paradigm to examine the ease at which they could think of 
positive and negative future experiences. They found that control participants tended 
to generate more positive than negative experiences, whereas those with anxiety and 
depression showed greater anticipation of negative experiences and reduced 
anticipation of positive experiences. Anxious-only participants anticipated more 
future negative experiences. These findings have been consistently replicated 
(MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, Carroll & Hunter, 1997). Existing research has indicated 
that affect can be divided into two higher order dimensions – positive affect (PA) and 
negative affect (NA), which are orthogonal dimensions rather than uni-dimensional 
(MacLeod, Byrne & Valentine, 1996). It has been demonstrated that anxiety consists 
of high NA, whilst depression is made up of high NA and low PA. Expanding on this 
distinction, Stӧber (2000) found that anxiety only was related to enhanced imagery for 
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future negative events whilst Vilhauer et al. (2012) highlighted that people with 
depression do not have greater negative views of the future than non-depressed 
people, but rather they produce fewer positive anticipations about the future.  
Whilst several studies such as these described above have reported differences 
in the quantity of positive and negative future thoughts for people who are anxious 
and/or depressed or dysphoric, the quality of the thoughts and pre-experiencing of 
positive and negative future directed thinking in people with anxiety and/or 
depression has not been looked as extensively. The closest study to look at the quality 
of future directed thoughts in those with a depressive disorder is that by King, 
MacDougall et al. (2011). They expanded on the study by MacLeod et al. (1997) by 
using a future-directed Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, 
Wincour & Moscovitch, 2002), which distinguishes between the episodic and non-
episodic details given by participants when describing a future event, in addition to 
the number of positive and negative events generated. They found that patients with 
highly recurrent Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) showed a selective deficit in the 
generation of episodic details (details referring to the main event, including 
happenings, people, time, place, sensory perceptions, thoughts, and emotions) 
concerning imagined future events; whilst the generation of non-episodic (semantic, 
not related to main event) details was not affected. However, in this study they did not 
ask participants to complete a measure looking at the phenomenological 
characteristics of the events generated, that is, the extent to which they felt they ‘pre-
experienced’ the event they were describing.  
The present study also uses the AI as a means of distinguishing between 
episodic and non-episodic details in events described as it encourages participants to 
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provide a richer description of the event they are imagining. This will be 
complimented by the addition of a second measure to assess cognitive representations 
of future events - an adapted version of the Phenomenological Characteristics 
Questionnaire (Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016) which asks participants to rate aspects 
such as the extent to which they felt they ‘pre-experienced’ the event, how much they 
felt they travelled forward to the event and how vivid it was, in order to get a sense of 
the ‘here and now’ experience.  
Emotional responsiveness 
As mentioned previously, pre-experiencing has both a cognitive element of the 
quality of the representation about the future and an affective aspect of how the 
person feels in-the-moment when thinking about the future.  There is a substantial 
literature on how people respond emotionally to events as they occur, but little on 
how people anticipate such events.  
Moods and emotions can be considered distinct from one another. Moods can 
be considered as diffuse, slow-moving feeling states weakly tied to specific 
environmental stimuli (Watson, 2000), whilst emotions are faster-moving reactions 
when a meaningful stimulus such as a threatening object is encountered (Bylsma, 
Morris & Rottenberg, 2008). Moods alter the probability of having specific emotions. 
Emotional reactivity is therefore multicomponential and will involve several response 
systems including perception, feelings, expressive behaviour and physiology; and 
moods are thought to potentiate like-valenced or matching emotions (Bylsma et al., 
2008).  
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In their review on emotional reactivity in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), 
Bylsma et al., (2008) highlight three views regarding how MDD might alter emotional 
reactivity as events occur, based on Rottenberg, Gross and Gotlib’s (2004) theory. 
The negative potentiation hypothesis proposes that depressed individuals will exhibit 
potentiated, or heightened, emotional reactivity to negative emotional stimuli. This 
view is based on the work of Beck (1967) where it has long been suggested that 
depressed individuals show pervasive negativity of thought and affect when thinking 
about the self, world and future, and how negative mood states prime negative 
cognitive structures which precipitate negative emotions when negative stimuli are 
encountered, making them mutually reinforcing. The second hypothesis is positive 
attenuation, where depressed individuals’ low positive mood, (as demonstrated in 
typical symptoms such as anhedonia, fatigue, apathy and behavioural inactivity) is an 
indicator that they are likely to show attenuated, or reduced, emotional reactivity to 
positive emotional stimuli. Finally, the third hypothesis proposed by Rottenberg et al., 
(2004) is the emotion context insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis. This takes a more global 
view of emotional reactivity in depression, suggesting that such individuals will 
exhibit diminished reactivity to all stimuli, regardless of valence.  The basis of this 
hypothesis comes from the perspective that depression is characterised by 
disengagement with one’s environment, which from an evolutionary perspective may 
prevent irresponsible actions (Nesse, 2000). Rottenberg et al., (2005) argue that 
compelling evidence for the ECI hypothesis comes from studies looking at how 
people react when viewing affective pictures, with depressed participants showing 
less affective modulation. Furthermore, when reviewing the findings on these three 
hypotheses in MDD, Bylsma et al., (2008) commented that although the findings are 
somewhat mixed, there is more support for the idea that depression is related to 
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reductions in both positive and negative emotional reactivity to events occurring but 
with a greater reduction in positive emotional reactivity.   
Theoretical and clinical relevance  
The findings outlined above offer the closest parallel for a framework within 
to which to make predications in the current study, which will aim to understand how 
people respond to emotional stimuli that they anticipate as opposed to events they 
have already experienced.  Addressing this gap in the literature is clinically relevant, 
as when prospection goes awry, it negatively influences emotion and behaviour as 
well as other aspects of cognition (Roepke & Seligman, 2016). In fact, Roepke & 
Seligman (2016) argue that depression is in fact the consequence of faulty 
prospection. Understanding more about prospection and pre-experiencing in anxiety 
and depression and the related here and now emotional response may highlight 
barriers that could impact upon the success of therapeutic outcomes. When simulating 
possible futures, people pre-experience possible consequences of these futures in real 
time; feeling anxiety, joy, or sadness depending on the nature of their simulations and 
when functioning normally, pre-experiencing likely facilitates better decision-making 
by helping people plan, self-regulate and problem solve (Roepke & Seligman, 2016).  
Evidence suggests that retrieving and simulating positive events can be useful 
in terms of repairing low mood and challenging negative perceptions that an 
individual may hold about themselves, their personal history and what the future may 
hold (Anderson et al., 2016). In line with this, evidence has also demonstrated how 
college students who simulated details and emotions associated with an ongoing 
stressful event reported using more effective coping strategies one week later 
compared with control groups (Taylor et al., 1998). In a similar vein, a study by 
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Brown, MacLeod, Tata and Goddard (2002) found that those pregnant women who 
were asked to simulate going into labour who experienced more detailed and coherent 
simulations, reported a higher subjective probability of a positive outcome related to 
the future event. Such findings can be considered in the context of the positivity bias 
mentioned previously, whereby when it comes to predicting what may happen in the 
future, humans tend to overestimate the likelihood of positive events, and 
underestimate the likelihood of negative event. Given the theme underlying these 
findings, it follows on that understanding more about the quality of future thoughts in 
those with elevated depression or dysphoria and how such thoughts make people feel 
has adaptive value. The potential application of positive future simulations may 
change the way people with depression not only think about the future, but also shape 
their sense of self and identity via the act of projecting oneself into meaningful future 
events, such as scenarios related to significant themes and concerns in one’s life 
(Schacter, 2012).  
With the negative cognitions that occur in anxiety and depressed mood, it can 
also be less disheartening to think things could change in the future – so focusing on 
dysfunctional beliefs about the future could foster greater resilience and coping. 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy already targets prospection – (e.g. goal setting and 
behavioural activation). However, if the client is experiencing reduced emotional 
reactivity to future events, motivation to engage in goal directed behaviour is likely to 
be reduced. Thoughts about the future could be targeted and biases corrected through 
identifying imagery related to the thought.  
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The present study 
Overview 
Fifty-four undergraduate students were given cue words and asked to imagine 
and describe specific events in the future that the word makes them think of. 
Cognitive representations of future events were assessed by the future directed AI, 
which scores the number of episodic details in each description, and via ratings of 
various phenomenological characteristics of each imagined event as they experienced 
it. Emotional reactions to thinking about future events was measured using in-the-
moment- affect ratings (both at baseline and after cues) on happy, relaxed, anxious 
and sad mood states and also via two questions on the phenomenal characteristics 
questionnaire asking for a rating on anticipated emotions (those expected to feel if the 
events occurred) and intensity of anticipatory emotions felt in the here and now. 
Finally, Participants also completed measures of depression and anxiety. Two groups 
- dysphoric and non-dysphoric were created based on scores on this depression 
measure.
1
  
Hypotheses 
The possible hypotheses put forward in this study on dysphoric participants 
are based on existing literature on the emotional experience of remembered and 
present events in those with depression outlined above, but there are no strong 
grounds for selecting between them given the novel aspect of this study: 
                                                          
1
 It is important to highlight that the ‘dysphoric’ group in the present study cannot be classed as 
clinically depressed. Previous research has indicated that depression in college students is an 
appropriate analogue for depression in clinical patients, evidenced by similar findings when 
comparing results of studies using student samples with those using clinical samples (Hill, Kemp-
Wheeler & Jones, 1987; Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993). 
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Hypothesis 1: Participants in the dysphoric group may score lower on 
measures of the quality of future thoughts than controls in response to all cues 
regardless of valence. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants in the dysphoric group will show reduced emotional 
reactivity to all cues (regardless of valence) in line with the emotion context 
insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis in comparison to the control group.  
Hypothesis 3: For positive cues, participants in the dysphoric group may score 
lower on measures of quality of future thoughts than the control group, in line with 
the positive attenuation hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: For positive cues, participants in the dysphoric group will show 
reduced emotional reactivity in comparison to the control group, in line with the 
positive attenuation hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5: For negative cues, in comparison to the control group 
participants in the dysphoric group may show elevated emotional reactivity, that is, 
low mood will be associated with negative potentiation.  
Hypothesis 6: For negative cues, participants in the dysphoric group may show 
greater quality of future thought in comparison to the control group, that is, low mood 
will be associated with negative potentiation.   
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Method 
Design 
The study employed a 2 (Group: Dysphoric, Control) x 2 (Cue Valence: 
Positive, Negative) mixed model design to investigate whether there are differences 
between the dysphoric group compared to controls on the Phenomenological 
Characteristics Questionnaire and future directed Autobiographical Interview for 
positive and negative events in the next few weeks and next few years.  
Participants  
A sample of University students was recruited (N = 54, 93% female, age range 
18-44). Participants were grouped into dysphoric and non-dysphoric controls 
according to their scores on a depression measure. 
Participants were students at RHUL, a minimum age of 18, and have a good 
understanding of written and spoken English. There were no other exclusion criteria. 
Of the 54 who attended their allocated time slot, all were suitable to participate. 
Recruitment and data collection took place over a three-month period (November 
2017 to January 2018). 
Power Analysis  
Power analysis indicated that a required total sample size of 52 (26 in each 
group) is needed to achieve a large effect size, holding alpha at 0.05 with a power of 
.80 for comparisons between the dysphoric and control group. A large effect size is 
practically feasible and is the standard used in similar studies (Bylsma, Morris & 
Rottenberg, 2008).  
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Recruitment  
Fifty participants were recruited from the RHUL Credit Pool. The study was 
advertised on the RHUL Experiment Management System where students who are 
interested sign up to an available time slot in exchange for course credits. Once they 
had signed up, each participant was emailed a Participant Information Sheet 
(Appendix 4) which provided more detail on the study and what they should expect if 
they participate. The remaining participants were recruited via advertisement posters 
put up around the RHUL campus. Only nine people responded to these posters. Once 
these participants expressed an interest in participating by emailing the researcher, 
they were sent the Participant Information Sheet for more information, and offered 
time slots if they were still interested in taking part. Four participants were eventually 
recruited from campus advertisements. A prize draw for participants recruited from 
campus was offered (for one £40, two £20 and two £10 Amazon Vouchers).  
Ethics 
The study received ethical approval by the Royal Holloway University of 
London Research and Ethics Committee in October 2017 (Appendix 5). 
Materials  
All measures below (with the exception of the AI Coding and Scoring) were 
embedded into an online questionnaire package designed by the researcher. 
Demographics  
All participants were asked to give demographic information on gender, age 
range and educational level at the start of the study, using a tick box questionnaire. 
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Depression and anxiety 
The PHQ-9 (Kroenke, Spitzer & Williams, 2001; Appendix 6) is a self-report 
measure that establishes the severity of symptoms of depression, based on DSM-IV 
criteria for Major Depressive Disorder. This measure was selected for clinical 
usefulness in this analogue study. It is a measure typically used in clinical services 
and the same cut off scores were used to classify the two groups in this study as such 
services, thus the dysphoric group are participants who would typically be offered 
treatment for depression in clinical services. The internal reliability of the PHQ-9 is 
excellent, with a Cronbach's α of 0.89 in a study on primary care clients and 0.86 in a 
study in a different population (gynaecological). In terms of validity, ROC analysis 
showed that the area under the curve for the PHQ-9 in diagnosing major depression 
was 0.95, suggesting a test that discriminates well between persons with and without 
major depression. Construct validity was established by the strong association 
between PHQ-9 scores and functional status, disability days, and symptom-related 
difficulty. External validity was achieved by replicating the findings from the 3,000 
primary care patients in a second sample of 3,000 obstetrics-gynaecology patients. 
With regard to cut off points, <5 indicates absence of depression; 5-9 indicates 
subthreshold depression; 10-14 identifies spectrum of clinical patients; >15 indicates 
major depression. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the PHQ-9 (α = .86) indicating 
a high level of internal consistency for this scale in the present study. 
The GAD-7 (Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Lowe, 2006; Appendix 7) is 
another self-report measure and has been shown to be an excellent severity measure 
of anxiety, where the criteria are based on those in the DSM-IV for generalised 
anxiety disorder. The internal consistency of the GAD-7 has been shown to be 
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excellent (Cronbach α=.92). Test-retest reliability is also good (intraclass 
correlation=0.83). Comparison of scores derived from the self-report scales with those 
derived from the mental health professional administered versions of the same scales 
yielded similar results (intraclass correlation=0.83), indicating good procedural 
validity. In terms of construct validity, a strong association has been found between 
increasing GAD-7 severity scores and worsening function on functional status, 
disability and other general health scales. With regard to symptom severity, cut off 
points of 5, 10, and 15 represent mild, moderate, and severe levels of anxiety.  
In-the-moment affect 
An additional measure was devised to capture participants’ current or ‘in the 
moment’ mood ratings (Appendix 8) on four emotional states - happy, relaxed, 
anxious and sad, using a 7-point Likert Scale (1=not at all; 7=completely). These four 
mood states were chosen based on the circumplex model of affect (Russell, 1980). 
Happy represents active (or high arousal) pleasant emotion, anxious a high arousal 
unpleasant emotion, relaxed a low arousal pleasant emotion, and sadness a low 
activation unpleasant emotion.  
Autobiographical Interview (AI) – Future Version (Addis, Wong, & 
Schacter, 2008) 
The Future-Directed AI elicits descriptions of specific events which may occur 
in the participant’s personal future (i.e., simulations). It has been used in several 
studies looking at future directed thinking with people with emotional disorders  
(Brown et al., 2013; King, Williams et al., 2011; King, MacDougall et al., 2011; 
Parlar et al., 2016). The administration of the AI followed the adapted manual 
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provided by Levine et al. (2002), but the references and instructions to past focused 
events were removed.  
Cue words were selected from the Affective Norms for English Words 
(ANEW) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999). Using a graph presented with the 
database of valence means for each word, eight words that scored above the midline 
(score of 5 or above indicates positive valence) or below the midline (score of below 
5 indicates negative valenced) were randomly selected. Each cue word had a time 
frame (next few weeks or next few years) presented alongside it. In total, there were 
eight cue words, which were divided into four blocks of two cues – two positively 
valenced cue words for the next few weeks (win, compliment) and for the next few 
years (gift, success); two negatively valenced cue words for the next few weeks 
(danger, mistake) and for the next few years (traitor, injury) (Appendix 9). For each 
word participants were asked to verbally describe a specific event that could 
realistically happen to them in the given time frame. They were given up to three 
minutes to describe the event in as much detail as possible. The interview was audio-
recorded for later transcription and subsequent coding. The researcher was able to 
prompt the participant if the description needs to be more specific, or to ask for 
clarification on certain details.   
Autobiographical Interview Scoring and Coding (Addis et al., 2008) 
A Manual was obtained from Levine et al., (2002), which provides guidelines 
on categorizing responses as internal or external, and rules regarding segmentation of 
responses. Following transcription of the participants’ responses to the AI, the scorer 
(main researcher) isolated or defined the main event, then segmented the entire 
response into individual idea units (details). These individual units are then coded and 
74 
 
internal or external. Internal details include event, place and time details, as well as 
perceptual and emotional/thought details. External details are semantic details of 
general knowledge/fact, repetition of prior information and other details such as meta-
cognitive statements and inferences. The number of internal and external details are 
then tallied for each event and then the totals averaged across the events in each of the 
four conditions (the greater the number of internal details provided, the richer the pre-
experiencing of the event). This measure tends to have high interrater reliability of the 
composite scores assessed by intraclass correlation (coefficients for internal and 
external detail composites in the original study by Levine et al., 2002 were 0.88 and 
0.96 respectively for recall; and .96 and .92 respectively for Addis et al., 2008 in their 
future thoughts version). A proportion of the coding in the present study (283 
segments of information) were blind rated by a second rater after a process of 
calibration of scoring rules, and achieved good level of agreement (κ = .84).  
Adapted version of the Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire 
(PCQ, Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016)  
The PCQ- Future Version (Appendix 10) aims to measure participants’ 
personal experience of the event they imagine, and quality of their experience. 
Specific questions relevant to the present study needs were selected from the pool of 
PCQ items. Each question was rated on a 7-point Likert Scale (1=not at all; 
7=completely), and were as follows: When imagining the event, I feel I am 
experiencing it; I feel I travelled forward to the time when it happened; the event was 
vivid; the event was difficult to imagine. Two questions referred to the emotional 
experience of future thinking, specifically: I feel the emotions I would feel if the event 
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occurred; and the emotions I have when I think about the event were extremely 
positive to extremely negative.  
Various versions of this scale have commonly been used in research 
examining the quality of memories and adapted for prospection/future directed 
thinking (D’Argembeau & Van Der Linden, 2004, 2006 & 2012; Arnold, McDermott 
& Szpunar, 2011; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016). It is most common for the items on 
this scale to be looked at as individual items, but in a larger version of the PCQ 
containing more questions, D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2012) report good 
internal reliability (α = .82) when combined properties of sensory-perceptual qualities 
of future thoughts are looked at. 
Verbal Fluency Task (FAS) 
The FAS task (Appendix 11), which is a test of phonemic verbal fluency, was 
included as a control task in this study, in order to control for possible effects of 
general verbal fluency when analysing coded descriptions given in the AI. Verbal 
fluency tasks are often included in neuropsychological assessment, in clinical 
practice, and in research given their face validity as tests of both verbal ability and 
executive control, thus making them an effective screening instrument of general 
verbal functioning (Shao, Janse, Visser & Meyer, 2014). Participants were given one 
minute to generate as many unique words as they could that began with each of three 
letters (F, A and S respectively). The total number of correct words comprises the 
overall score. The participants were informed that the words should not include names 
of people or places, numbers or sequences involving the same word (for example, 
give and given).  
76 
 
Piloting 
Before recruitment for this study took place, a small pilot was carried out, with 
the aims of: 
1. Determining whether the online questionnaire package was adequately 
presented and easy to follow visually and technologically  
2. Determining whether the procedural instructions were adequate and clear  
3. Estimating the time required for the full procedure to be carried out 
4. Gathering feedback on participant experience of engaging in the study 
procedure  
A small group of 5 doctoral students at RHUL took part in this pilot study, and 
completed a brief interview with the researcher to gather feedback on the above 
questions. A full list of feedback is provided in Appendix 12. The general feedback 
indicated that the online package was adequately presented, however two of five of 
these students suggested the text could be larger, especially for the cue words, and a 
label stating ‘next page’ should be added to the buttons to proceed at the bottom of the 
screen. Feedback related to the instructions suggested that it was not clear enough that 
the event should be completely new and not related to something that has happened 
before. Therefore, “think of a novel event” was replaced with the following 
instruction “instead of remembering things that have happened to you before, I want 
you to create or imagine or invent a scenario that hasn’t happened to you before.  That 
way, we can see how your mind is able to project into the future about things you 
haven’t yet experienced.”  
The pilot identified that the full procedure including completion of all 
measures took a minimum of 35 minutes and a maximum of 55 minutes for the small 
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group upon which it was piloted. The overall comments on the experience of 
participating in the study was that although it was hard to generate novel events on the 
spot, it was enjoyable and did not feel distressing in any way.  
Procedure 
Participants completed the study on a computer screen in an office in the 
psychology department at RHUL. The researcher was present in the room throughout 
to clarify instructions, audio-record answers to each cue word in the AI and 
administer the verbal fluency task. The first set of questions obtained informed 
consent (Appendix 13), and were followed by questions on demographic information 
and a current mood rating on the four emotional states.  
Following this, verbal instructions for the AI were read out to the participants 
by the researcher, as well as displayed on the screen in front of them. The instructions 
were as follows:  
“I want you to think about a single event that might happen on a particular day 
in the future, but here instead of remembering things that have happened to you 
before, I you want to create or imagine or invent a scenario that hasn’t happened to 
you before.  That way, we can see how your mind is able to project into the future 
about things you haven’t yet experienced. When creating these future scenarios, you 
can be creative, but you cannot be totally unrealistic, so you can’t tell me about going 
to the moon, for example.  So you want to think about scenarios which are plausible 
given your plans and thoughts about the future. For all these events, you will be given 
three minutes to tell me as much detail as you can about them. So remember, you can 
tell me everything you can imagine about the event, that particular day, what you are 
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doing, thinking or feeling. We are not so much interested in which events you choose 
to describe, but how much detail you can recall or imagine when you describe them. It 
doesn’t matter whether the event is important or trivial, as long as it is an event which 
is specific in time and place, and was one that you are personally involved in (so not 
something someone else told you about). I will be guiding you to help make sure you 
come up with a specific event, so I may be interrupting you at some points.  And 
when I say stop we will move on to the next part.” 
Once it was clarified that participants understood the instructions, two practice 
trials were completed using neutral cue words; and then the first positive or negative 
cue word in the AI was presented on the screen. Three minutes was timed on a stop 
watch, and if participants stopped talking sooner than three minutes, the researcher 
asked for clarification as to whether any more detail could be provided before 
stopping the time prematurely. After each event description for each cue word, 
participants were presented with the PCQ before moving on to the next cue word.  
The four blocks (short term positive and negative, long term positive and 
negative) were presented to participants in four different versions to partially control 
for order effects. In between each block, participants were again presented with the 
rating questions for an ‘in the moment’ snapshot of where they were on the four mood 
states. An additional ninth positive cue word was included for all participants, to 
offset the effects of ending on a negative event description. The responses to this cue 
word were not included in any analyses. 
Once all nine cue words had been presented and events described, the 
participants were presented with the PHQ-9 and GAD-7 questionnaires on screen. The 
completion of these measures indicated the end of their participation and they were 
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provided with a debrief sheet which included details on two organisations they could 
contact for support (Appendix 14) and given the opportunity to ask any questions. 
They were asked to contact the researcher if they would like to be sent an update on 
the outcome of the study via email and thanked for their participation.  
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Results 
This section will begin by results from matching of the two groups in terms of 
demographics and depression scores. A series of 2 (Group: dysphoric vs control) x 2 
(Valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (temporal distance) ANOVA’s were conducted to 
explore differences between the two groups and their responses to each of the 6 
questions on the Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaires, which will be 
presented and discussed individually. Following this, results from a 2 (Group: 
dysphoric vs control) x 2 (Valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (temporal distance) x 2 
(Type: internal vs external) ANOVA conducted to look at the group differences 
between the amount of internal and external details provided on the Autobiographical 
Interview for short term and long term, positive and negative cues will be presented. 
Finally, the group differences on the in-the-moment affect measures following each 
set of cue words will be presented. The results will focus mainly on the observed 
differences between the dysphoric and control groups, as these are the findings of 
interest pertinent to the aims of the study, but for completeness any additional results 
that were significant will also be reported.  All data were analysed using The 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21.0.  
Preliminary Data Analysis 
All data were checked to ensure there are no missing data and values had been 
inputted correctly. There were no missing data, so the analyses presented in this 
chapter are based on totals. 
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Normality of Data 
The distribution for each variable in the analyses was examined in the four 
separate blocks of short term positive, short term negative, long term positive and 
long term negative cues.  Skew and kurtosis were calculated for each. The majority 
were in the normal range (z < 2.58, p < .01, Field, 2011). However, for all four 
blocks, the AI variables were positively skewed. For the short term and long term 
positive blocks, and the long term negative block, both the internal and external detail 
variables were skewed (short term z = 3.43, z = 2.92; long term positive z = 3.12, z = 
2.67, long term negative z = 3.58, z = 3.46, for internal and external details 
respectively). For the short term negative block, the external details variable was 
skewed (z = 2.97). Examination of boxplots indicated that there were three 
participants who could be considered as outliers, defined by their scores being more 
than three standard deviations above the mean of that variable. Given that removing 
these three participants’ data would mean a loss of power, it was decided that 
manually Winsorizing the scores would be more appropriate. Therefore, the three 
participants’ values on these variables were changed to be closer to other values in the 
data set, whilst altering the lower end of the cut-off point (three standard deviations 
below the mean) to compensate for this change. The data for PCQ Question 5 in the 
short term negative block was also significantly positively skewed (z = 4.00), but 
there were no outliers upon examining the data. A square root transformation was 
carried out on all the PCQ5 scores which resulted in them being all normally 
distributed.  
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Group Characteristics  
The groups were created based on their scores on the PHQ-9, following the 
recommended cut-off scores (Kroenke et al., 2001). A score of 10 or more indicated 
the presence of depressive symptomology, and therefore participants scoring at or 
above this score were allocated to the dysphoric group for analyses (n = 25, M = 
15.36, SD = 4.56), and a score of 9 or less defined participants in the control group (n 
= 29, M = 5.59, SD = 2.58). As expected, there was a high level of overlap between 
depression and anxiety, with the dysphoric group reporting significantly higher levels 
of anxiety on the GAD-7 (M =11.44, SD = 4.76; Control M = 5.10, SD = 3.34, t(52) 
= 5.72, p <.001). 
The majority of the sample were in the 18-24 age range. For the dysphoric 
group, 96% were in this age bracket (n = 24) and 90% for the control group (n = 26). 
One person in the dysphoric group was in the 25-34 age bracket, compared to two 
people in the control group. One person in the control group was in the 35-44 age 
group. A chi squared analysis indicated there were no significant differences between 
the groups on age (χ² (2) = 1.12, p = .570). 
The sample was 93% female. The dysphoric group had 23 females, 1 male, 
and 1 person who identified as transgender. The control group had 27 females and 2 
males. There were no significant differences between the groups on gender (t(52) = -
.927, p = .358). 
Table 4 presents the ethnic backgrounds of the sample. A chi-Squared analysis 
was conducted to determine if there were significant differences between the groups. 
For this, different ethnicities were grouped into three categories, based on the makeup 
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of the sample. These categories were White English, White Other and Other. There 
were no significant difference between the groups (χ² (2) = .349, p = .840).  
The majority of the sample had achieved education up to A Level 
qualification. Table 5 presents the educational background for each group. A chi-
Squared analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between the 
groups in terms of educational level (χ² (3) = .052, p = .997).  
Table 4 
Ethnicity of Groups 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Dysphoric 
Group n (%) 
Control Group     
n (%) 
White English 10 (40) 13 (45) 
White Other 7 (28) 8 (28) 
Asian Indian 3 (12) 2 (7) 
Asian Pakistani 2 (8) 1 (3) 
Mixed Other 1 (4) 2 (7) 
Chinese 1 (4) 0 
Arab 1 (4) 0 
Asian 
Bangladeshi 
0 1 (3) 
Asian Other 0 1 (3) 
Other  0 1 (3) 
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Table 5 
Educational Background of groups  
 
 
 
 
 
 
An independent t-test was used to compare the verbal fluency scores of the 
dysphoric group (M = 37.20, SD = 10.38) and controls (M = 37.10, SD = 6.91). 
There were no significant differences between the groups (t(52) = -.041, p = .968).  
Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations for each group on the 
baseline in-the-moment affect measures. Separate variance estimates were used since 
homogeneity of variance assumptions were not met for the happy, anxious and sad 
mood states. There were significant differences between the two groups on their 
baseline levels of happiness (t(42) = 2.79, p = .008), with the dysphoric group feeling 
less happy. There were also significant differences between the two groups on levels 
of feeling relaxed (t(52) = 3.05, p = .004) with the dysphoric group reported 
themselves as less relaxed. The dysphoric group also reported themselves as 
significantly more anxious (t(44) = 3.69, p = .001). However the differences between 
the dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups on their ratings of baseline sadness failed to 
reach significance (t(35) = 1.92, p = .063).  
 
 
  Dysphoric 
Group n (%) 
Control 
Group n (%) 
GCSE 1 (4) 1 (3) 
A Level 21 (84) 25 (86) 
Bachelors Degree 2 (8) 0 
Other 0 3 (10) 
Did not disclose 1 (4) 0 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations between groups for each In-The-Moment Affect 
Rating 
Mood State Dysphoric Group M  
(SD) 
Non-Dysphoric Group M 
(SD) 
Happy 4.36 (1.38) 5.28 (0.96) 
Relaxed 4.16 (1.43) 5.21 (1.08) 
Anxious 3.40 (1.44) 2.10 (1.08) 
Sad 2.20 (1.68) 1.48 (0.87) 
Note: M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation 
 
Phenomenological Characteristics of Future Thoughts  
Each item on the PCQ was treated independently for purpose of analyses. 
Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics for each group on each item, separated by 
temporal distance and valence of cue words. Six 2 (Group: dysphoric vs control) x 2 
(Valence: positive vs negative) x 2 (temporal distance) ANOVA’S were carried out to 
determine if there were any significant differences between the groups’ ratings. 
PCQ Question 1 - “When imagining the event, I feel as though I am 
experiencing it” 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F < 1), no Group x Valence (F 
< 1) or Group x Temporal Distance (F < 1) interaction and no three-way interaction 
(F(1,52) =1.81, p = .184).  
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations between groups for each PCQ Item 
PCQ Item Short Term M (SD) Long Term M (SD) 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
1 Dysphoric 
Control 
4.54 (1.52) 
4.72 (1.37) 
4.68 (1.65) 
5.01 (1.31) 
4.56 (1.55) 
4.84 (1.50) 
4.46 (1.57) 
4.27 (1.14) 
2 Dysphoric 
Control 
4.46 (1.45) 
4.37 (1.64) 
4.66 (1.60) 
4.63 (1.60) 
4.54 (1.61) 
4.63 (1.54) 
4.28 (1.67) 
3.89 (1.19) 
3 Dysphoric 
Control 
4.50 (1.25) 
4.58 (1.46) 
4.52 (1.59) 
4.65 (1.51) 
4.30 (1.67) 
4.58 (1.68) 
4.52 (1.57) 
4.24 (1.64) 
4 Dysphoric 
Control 
4.40 (1.35) 
4.39 (1.06) 
4.70 (1.37) 
4.65 (1.36) 
4.34 (1.59) 
4.37 (1.50) 
4.02 (1.66) 
4.17 (1.25) 
5 Dysphoric 
Control 
3.22 (1.43) 
2.50 (1.34) 
2.78 (1.64) 
2.31 (1.56) 
2.80 (1.18) 
2.62 (1.55) 
3.08 (1.32) 
2.96 (1.30) 
6 Dysphoric 
Control 
4.72 (1.39) 
5.65 (1.04) 
2.30 (0.92) 
2.75 (0.91) 
5.20 (1.13) 
5.96 (1.03) 
2.24 (0.85) 
2.77 (1.07) 
Note: M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation 
 
 
PCQ Question 2 – “When imaging the event, I feel that I travel forward 
to the time when it would happen” 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F < 1), no Group x Valence 
(F(1,52) = 1.32, p = .254) or Group x Temporal Distance (F < 1) interaction. There 
was also no significant three-way interaction (F(1,52) = 1.01, p = .321). 
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PCQ Question 3 – “When imagining the event, I feel the emotions I would 
feel if the event occurred” 
There was no significant main effect for Group (F < 1), Group x Valence 
(F(1,52) = 1.21, p = .275), or Group x Temporal Distance (F < 1) interactions. There 
was also no significant three-way interaction (F(1,52) = 1.74, p = .193).  
PCQ Question 4 – “The event was vivid” 
 There was no significant main effect for Group (F < 1), and no significant 
Group x Valence interaction (F < 1). There was no significant interaction for Group x 
Temporal Distance either (F < 1). There was a significant effect for Temporal 
Distance (F(1,52) = 5.42, p = .024) indicating that participants felt that shorter term 
events were more vivid than long term events. 
PCQ Question 5 – “The event was difficult to imagine” 
There was no significant main effect of group (F(1,52) = 1.84, p =.181). There was no 
Group x Valence (F < 1) or Group x Temporal Distance (F(1,52) = 2.19, p = .145) or 
three way interaction (F <1).  
PCQ Question 6 – Emotions when thinking about the event  
 For PCQ6, there was a significant main effect of group (F(1,52) = 16.46, p = 
< .001, n²p= .24), with dysphoric participants experiencing more negative emotions 
than controls when thinking about the future events. There was also a significant 
effect for valence (F(1,52) = 331.15, p = <.001, n²p= .86), indicating, as would be 
expected, that participants’ emotions felt when imagining future events were more 
negative in response to the negative cues, and more positive in response to the 
positive cues. No other effects were significant (Group x Valence (F(1,52) = 1.26, p = 
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.268), Group x Temporal Distance (F < 1) and Group x Valence x Temporal Distance 
(F < 1). 
Future Directed Autobiographical Interview  
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for the groups on the AI. There was 
no significant main effect of Group (F < 1), or Group x Valence x Type (F < 1) and 
Group x Temporal Distance x Type (F < 1) interactions. There was also no significant 
interaction between Group x Valence x Temporal Distance x Type (F(1,52) = 2.01, p 
= .163). There was a significant effect for Valence (F(1,52) = 13.01, p = .001) 
indicating that participants gave significantly more detail in general (internal and 
external) for negative cues. A significant interaction between Valence x Type was 
also found (F(1,52) = 11.08, p = .002). Post hoc t-tests indicated there was 
significantly more episodic (internal) detail provided for negative cues than for 
positive cues (t(215) = 3.86, p <.001).  
Table 8 
Means between groups for internal and external details on the AI 
AI Short Term M (SD) Long Term M (SD) 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Internal Dysphoric 
Control 
26.76 (10.48) 
27.46 (11.58) 
31.92 (12.98) 
35.01 (14.34) 
27.40 (12.76) 
29.84 (14.47) 
28.00 (9.45) 
31.36 (15.14) 
External Dysphoric 
Control 
14.90 (9.98) 
16.20 (9.09) 
16.40 (8.89) 
14.48 (8.76) 
16.44 (7.76) 
16.27 (7.14) 
13.96 (7.49) 
16.75 (8.46) 
Note: M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation 
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Mood Ratings  
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for both groups on each of the four 
mood states collected after each block. 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVAS, covarying the relevant 
baseline scores, were conducted to explore differences between the two groups on 
here and now mood ratings following each block of cues. The means have been 
adjusted to account for baseline mood.  
Happy 
There was a significant main effect of Group (F(1,51) = 16.29, p = < .001, n²p 
= .24), because participants in the dysphoric group felt less happy (M = 3.78, SD = 
0.45) than the control group (M = 5.17, SD = 0.33) after describing  future events, 
after controlling for any initial variations in baseline happiness. Figure 2 illustrates 
this effect visually by showing the change scores for the happiness mood state in each 
of the four blocks. The dysphoric group presented as less happy after all of the blocks. 
There was no interaction for Group x Valence (F < 1) or Group x Temporal Distance 
(F < 1) or a three way interaction between Group x Temporal Distance x Valence (F < 
1). There was an effect for valence (F(1,51) = 6.60, p = .013) indicating that 
participants rated themselves as significantly happier after positive cues than negative 
cues. 
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Figure 2: Change Scores for Happy Mood Rating 
 
Relaxed  
There was a significant main effect for Group (F(1,51) = 9.00, p = .004, n²p = 
.15), indicating participants in the dysphoric group rated themselves as less relaxed 
(M = 3.30, SD = 0.42) after future event descriptions compared to those in the control 
group (M = 4.69, SD = 0.05) after controlling for any initial variations in baseline 
levels of relaxation. To illustrate this, Figure 3 shows the change scores for the 
relaxed mood state in each group for each condition. There was no significant Group 
x Valence interaction (F(1,51) = 3.84, p = .055) or Group x Temporal Distance 
interaction (F < 1) or three way Group x Valence x Temporal Distance interaction 
(F(1, 51) = .290, p = .593).
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Table 9  
Means and Standard Deviations for each mood state 
Mood State Short Term Positive M 
(SD) 
Short Term Negative M 
(SD) 
Long Term positive M 
(SD) 
Long Term Negative M 
(SD) 
 Dysphoric Control Dysphoric Control Dysphoric Control Dysphoric Control 
Happy 4.04 (1.24) 5.38 (1.14) 3.48 (1.26) 4.86 (1.09) 4.28 (1.48) 5.52 (.87) 3.32 (1.28) 4.93 
(1.13) 
Relaxed 3.48 (1.44) 4.76 (1.27) 3.04 (1.51) 4.69 (1.46) 3.80 (1.41) 4.69 (1.44) 2.88 (1.39) 4.62 
(1.56) 
Anxious 3.68 (1.70) 2.10 (1.34) 3.84 (1.79) 2.38 (1.56) 3.48 (1.32) 2.07 (1.51) 4.12 (1.61) 2.17 
(1.51) 
Sad 1.92 (1.47) 1.41 (.98) 2.20 (1.70) 1.45 (.87) 1.76 (1.16) 1.41 (1.08) 2.32 (1.57) 1.38 
(.77) 
Note: M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation 
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Figure 3: Change Scores for Relaxed Mood Rating 
 
Anxious  
There was a significant main effect for Group (F(1,51) = 8.29, p = .006, n²p = 
.14), indicating participants in the dysphoric group rated themselves as more anxious 
(M = 3.78, SD = 0.27) than controls (M = 2.18, SD = 0.14) after thinking about 
future events after controlling for any initial variations in baseline anxiety. The 
difference between the groups is demonstrated in Figure 4. There was no significant 
interaction between Group x Valence (F < 1) or Group x Temporal Distance (F(1,51) 
= 2.79, p = .101) or a three way Group x Temporal Distance x Valence interaction 
(F(1,51) = 1.09, p = .301). There was a significant effect for temporal distance 
(F(1,51) = 4.72, p = .034) indicating that participants rated themselves as more 
anxious after longer term cues (events in the next few years) than following short term 
cues (events in the next few weeks). 
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Sad 
There was no significant main effect for Group (F(1,51) = 1.01, p = .320). 
There were also no significant interactions between Group and Valence (F(1,51) = 
2.05, p = .158) or Group and Temporal Distance (F < 1). There was also no 
significant three way interaction between Group x Temporal Distance x Valence (F < 
1). Figure 5 demonstrates the change scores for this mood rating. 
Figure 4: Change Scores for Anxious Mood Rating 
 
 
Figure 5: Change Scores for Sad Mood Rating 
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Discussion 
The present study aimed to examine the here-and-now experience that arises 
when people with and without low mood contemplate future events, to understand 
how people respond to emotional stimuli that they anticipate as opposed to events 
they have already experienced or are currently experiencing. Whilst the findings of 
this study suggest there are no differences in the kinds of thoughts people with or 
without dysphoric mood have about the future, the emotions felt when thinking about 
anticipated events are different.  
Cognitive representations of future events 
Based on existing literature on the emotional experience of recalled past 
events or present events, it was suggested that participants with low mood may score 
lower on measures of the quality of future-directed thoughts than controls, in line with 
the emotional context insensitivity (ECI) hypothesis (Rottenberg et al., 2005; Bylsma 
et al., 2008). Results of the present study indicated that there were no significant 
differences in the quality of future thoughts between dysphoric and control 
participants, even when valence was taken into account. This was consistent across 
the two measures of quality of future thoughts - the future-directed AI looking at the 
amount of episodic detail provided in the event descriptions and the PCQ, which 
indicated there were no differences in the extent to which participants in each group 
felt they ‘pre-experienced’ the event, travelled forward to the time of the event or on 
how vivid and difficult the event was to imagine.  
The finding above is in contrast to previous work by King, MacDougall et al., 
(2011) which found depressed participants to have deficits in generating specific 
episodic (internal) details when thinking about possible future events, when compared 
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to non-depressed controls. One possible reason for this disparity is that the depressed 
sample in King et al.’s study were clinically depressed, compared to the sample used 
in the present study where depression in university students was measured by a self-
report measure only, and therefore considered as analogous to clinical depression. 
Although there is literature on how depression in university students is comparable to 
those in clinical populations (Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993), it is likely that the 
depression symptomology in the present sample were less severe. There is also the 
possibility that the types of future events described by the student sample are very 
different to that of a general adult population. For example, the types of events 
described by the sample in this study were commonly centred on student-specific 
themes such as graduation, exams and meeting coursework deadlines, being away 
from family, and making friends. These kinds of events may be considered as 
generally quite anxiety provoking, as well as having a possible impact on mood. In 
line with this, there was such a high degree of overlap between depression and anxiety 
in this sample that it was not possible to partial out the effects of anxiety on the 
overall results, and so it cannot be ruled out that anxiety had an influence on the 
extent to which the events were pre-experienced, rather than depression.  
Furthermore, the questions selected to assess pre-experiencing may have 
influenced the findings of this present study. The six questions were taken from 
previous studies looking at autonoetic consciousness (D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2004; 2006; Lehner & D’Argembeau, 2016), but typically these studies tend 
to use considerably longer measures of pre-experiencing phenomena. Longer 
measures of phenomenological characteristics assess specific sensory aspects such as 
sights, sounds, spatial arrangements of objects and people, and the visual perspective 
taken for the event (observer perspective or first person perspective). Longer versions 
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of the questionnaires also look at aspects such as clarity of time of day, clarity of the 
location and the personal importance of the events described. For the purpose of the 
present study a shorter version was selected due to the inclusion of two measures of 
pre-experiencing – through the phenomenal characteristics of descriptions as well as 
the level of episodic detail provided (AI). Similarly, given that the pre-experiencing 
questionnaires were given to each participant eight times, it is possible that responder 
fatigue may encourage participants to answer the Likert scale questions quickly and 
without much thought.  
Although not pertinent to the research questions the present study did find that 
participants (irrespective of mood status) rated events that were temporally closer as 
more vivid. This finding replicates a finding by D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 
(2004) where people constructed more detailed representations when they thought that 
imagined events may happen in the near rather than distant future. Trope and 
Liberman (2003) offer a possible explanation for these findings, by suggesting that 
distant future events are more abstract, so people may have clearer representations of 
the kinds of events that may happen in the near future and already begun adapting 
their behaviour in order to achieve them. This could be the case for this particular 
sample, where events typically described such as meeting coursework deadlines and 
awaiting exam results were already likely to be underway.  
Emotional reactions to thinking about future events 
The second aim of the present study was to look at the emotional impact of 
thinking about the future. Hypotheses four and five suggested that those in the 
dysphoric group may show reduced emotional reactivity for positive cues, in line with 
the positive attenuation hypothesis, and elevated emotional reactivity for negative 
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cues, thus low mood would be associated with negative potentiation when people 
think about the future. The results of the present study do not indicate any group 
differences in emotional response specifically to positive versus negative cues.  
The inclusion of an ‘in the moment’ rating of mood states captured after each 
temporal distance and valence block (short term positive, short term negative, long 
term positive and long term negative) was a novel contribution of this study to the 
existing research. Interestingly, it was found that people who are even mildly 
depressed benefit less when thinking about things that could happen to them in the 
future. Specifically, they rated themselves as being less happy, less relaxed and more 
anxious after describing events, regardless of the valence of the events, even after 
controlling for initial mood levels.  
In a similar vein, additional measures of emotional reactivity to future events 
were included in the phenomenal characteristics questionnaire which also 
demonstrated a difference between groups on the emotional reaction related to 
thinking about the future. PCQ6 assessed the intensity of anticipatory emotions 
(emotions experienced in the present in response to anticipated future events), and the 
results of the present study show dysphoric participants experienced more negative 
and less positive emotion than controls when thinking about future events, regardless 
of their valence. PCQ3 on the other hand asked for a rating on anticipated emotions, 
that is, emotions the person thinks they would feel if the event occurred. The present 
study found no significant differences between the dysphoric and control group on 
anticipated emotions, lending support for the need to distinguish between the two 
types of emotional responses - anticipatory and anticipated (Barsics et al., 2016). 
Another account of emotional responsiveness in the moment is that by Kringelbach 
and Berridge (2012) who distinguish between two types of positive emotional states 
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in the moment - ‘liking’ and ‘wanting.’ Liking may be considered as the positive 
response that occurs to a pleasant stimulus as it is experienced, whilst wanting is the 
emotional response to a future pleasant stimulus that is anticipated but not yet 
occurred (Macleod, 2017).  Kringelbach and Berridge (2012) argue that similar but 
separable neurological pathways are associated with anticipation to those involved in 
liking. In their study, rats with excess dopamine move quickly towards a food reward, 
but don’t show elevated pleasure response on gaining the reward; whilst dopamine-
free rats show no interest in gaining reward but do show normal lip-licking when the 
reward is placed in their mouths, suggesting unimpaired ability to enjoy a reward 
when it happens. In the present study, the focus is on anticipatory ‘wanting’ states, 
however it could be argued that by asking people to project themselves into the future 
scenario and trying to elicit feelings as if it has actually happened, liking as an 
emotional state is also included. 
Interestingly, and contrary to what we might expect based on the present study 
findings related to differences in emotional reactivity to future events for people with 
low mood, there were no significant differences between the groups in the mood state 
‘sad’ when thinking about future events. One possible reason for this may be that the 
meaning of the word ‘sad’ has changed over time. For the current generation of young 
adults, the word ‘sad’ may be more commonly used as a synonym for words such as 
‘lame,’ or ‘pathetic’ rather than more typical mood related associations such as ‘glum’ 
or ‘miserable.’ Future studies employing this method of capturing mood states may 
benefit from using a less subjective word to represent melancholy or feeling ‘down.’  
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Strengths and limitations of the present study 
Strengths 
The present study offered a novel contribution to the current literature on pre-
experiencing the future by asking participants to rate how they felt in the here and 
now when they anticipated events, based on four mood states. This has provided new 
insight into how the emotional response related to prospection varies as a function of 
mood. In addition to this, the present study employed two methods of assessing pre-
experiencing, through the self-rating of phenomenal characteristics (PCQ) and the 
researcher-rated measure of episodic detail provided in event descriptions (AI) to 
focus on the qualitative details that make up the cognitive representation of an event 
description. This can be considered a more robust and thorough way of assessing pre-
experiencing phenomena.   
Limitations 
There are limitations of the present study that need to be taken into account 
when interpreting results. Firstly, as mentioned previously this study was based on a 
student population who were not clinically depressed. As mentioned briefly before, 
whilst some studies have found student samples to be acceptable analogues, it is 
important to consider differences which may have implications for how generalisable 
the findings are to a clinically depressed adult population, both in terms of depression 
status but also socioeconomic status of students compared to the general population 
(Hanel & Vione, 2016). The experience of distress is transient and not as severe as 
clinical depression, and being a university student in an unfamiliar environment 
having experienced a drastic change in lifestyle can be daunting, but these stressors 
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tend to be mild and last for a short period of time only (Barua, 2012). Students have 
also been found to show a different pattern of depressive symptomology than 
clinically depressed individuals, for instance, anhedonia has been shown to be 
significantly lower in student samples (Cox, Enns, Borger & Parker, 1999).  
There are also psychometric issues with self-report measures for depression in 
students. This study utilised the PHQ-9 due to its frequent use in clinical services, 
however it is important to note this whilst this measure has been used in student 
samples (Eisenberg, Golberstein & Gollust, 2007; Young, Fang & Zisook, 2010), it 
has yet to be validated on UK student samples. A study has validated the use of the 
PHQ-9 in a sample of Nigerian University Students, which is promising (Adewuya, 
Ola & Afolabi, 2006). Nonetheless, there is a lack of evidence for use of alternative 
measures of depressive symptomology in student samples. Whilst the Beck 
Depression Inventory –II (BDI) has been commonly used for depression studies in 
student samples (Nyer et al., 2015; Villatte, Marcotte & Potvin, 2017) and been 
shown to be comparable to clinical samples (Reiside et al., 2018), like the PHQ-9, the 
measure was not designed for this purpose, and the conventional cut-off points that 
are used in clinical samples have not been validated for students (Coyne, 1994). In 
their report on its psychometric properties, Beck, Steer and Garbin (1988) state that 
high scores on the BDI for university students should not be interpreted as indicative 
of depression and that they may simply represent diffuse maladaptive functioning. 
Another limitation of the sample is that it was predominantly female. The 
present study was focused on the emotional response of participants when describing 
possible positive and negative events. There is evidence highlighting that women 
show greater emotional expressivity, especially for positive emotions and 
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internalizing negative emotions such as sadness, guilt and fear (Chaplin, 2015). 
Therefore, it may be that the results of the present study that there were differences 
between dysphoric participants and controls on the here and now emotional 
experience may be biased by the lack of representativeness of the sample both in 
terms of mood status and reporting of emotions in the here and now.  
Secondly, order effects were only partially controlled for in this study. The 
four blocks of cues – short term positive, short term negative, long term positive and 
long term negative were presented in four different orders, however there are 
potentially 24 different orders the blocks could have been presented in. Finally, the 
choice of single word cues may influence findings. For instance, some of the words 
used typically evoked events where the participant was the main influencer, such as 
‘win,’ ‘success,’ ‘mistake’ and ‘injury;’ whilst other words used in this study typically 
tended to evoke events where the participant was the passive recipient, such as 
‘compliment,’ ‘traitor’ and ‘gift.’ Future studies should use different sets of positive 
and negative words to investigate whether this is a potential source of bias (MacLeod 
& Cropley, 1995). It has been argued that sentence stems represent a more reliable 
way of accessing everyday future thinking as opposed to single word cueing tasks 
(Raes et al., 2007; Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009), and so replication of this study using 
sentence completion task may yield different results. 
Conclusion 
The present study demonstrated that whilst there were no differences in the 
types of future-directed thoughts between dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals on 
two measures of the quality of future thoughts, the emotional response did in fact vary 
as a function of mood. This in turn has implications for clinical interventions targeting 
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future behaviour change, where consideration of the overwhelming nature of thinking 
about the future as well as impact of this on motivation to make change could be 
beneficial. Clinical implications are discussed further in Chapter 3. Future studies 
may wish to replicate the procedure used in the present study but with a clinically 
depressed sample of adults and using a more detailed measure of phenomenal 
characteristics of future events and/or using emotionally valenced sentence 
completion stems rather than single cue words.  
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Chapter 3: Integration, Impact, and Dissemination 
This section aims to synthesise the different aspects of Chapters 1 and 2, in the 
context of the theoretical and real-world impact of the findings, alongside a critical 
reflection on the process of undertaking these pieces of work.  
Integration 
Synergy between the Systematic Review and Empirical Study 
 The systematic review identified that people with elevated depression do show 
less specific thoughts about the future in comparison to people with lower levels of 
depression. If people with elevated negative mood think about the future in more 
abstract, and less detailed ways, one would expect the same pattern in their ability to 
pre-experience – that the cognitive feelings, or ‘autonoetic consciousness’ of possible 
future events would also be harder to imagine and less vivid. This provided a 
conceptual basis for the empirical study and the proposed hypotheses that there may 
be differences in the quality of future directed thoughts in people with elevated 
depression. Interestingly, the empirical study did not find any significant difference 
between those with elevated depression and controls with regard to the quality of 
cognitive representations, but did for the emotional response.  
The systematic review in Chapter 1 identified that studies where participants 
(although in the elevated depression group) did not meet clinical cut off scores for 
depressive symptomology or were recruited from community or student samples were 
less likely to find an effect for reduced specificity. It was suggested that depressive 
symptomology in these studies may not have been severe enough to contribute to an 
inability to imagine specific future scenarios. As mentioned previously, the present 
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study used a self-report depression measure in an undergraduate student sample and 
an elevated depression group was created on the basis of their scores on this measure. 
It could therefore be argued that the levels of depression in the sample used in the 
present study were not severe enough to demonstrate a significant difference in the 
cognitive representations, or quality, of future thoughts. A clinically depressed sample 
may then demonstrate both, differences in cognitive representations as well as the 
emotional reactions to thinking about the future.  
Reflections on the Processes of Undertaking this Work 
 Sample and Recruitment 
  The present study began as a clinical study, with the aim of using a 
clinical sample recruited from NHS primary care depression services. The proposed 
study would have accessed participants presenting to such services at the initial 
assessment phase, where clients meeting the clinical criteria for depression (which is 
typically assessed by the PHQ-9 in such services) would be asked by the practitioner 
carrying out the assessment if they are interested in taking part. If a client was 
interested, they would be asked for consent for their contact details to be passed onto 
the lead researcher who would then contact them to provide more information before 
consenting to participate in the study. The data collection phase was to be carried out 
at the service base or clients’ home if more convenient.  
However, there were two main difficulties which created obstacles to 
proceeding in this way. Firstly, it proved more difficult than anticipated to find 
relevant services in a time pressured NHS to participate. Five Primary Care NHS 
services focused on providing psychological treatment for depression were 
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approached by the researcher, however the typical feedback was that these services 
were too pressured and had a lack of staff resources to promote the study in their 
setting. Secondly, the proposal of the present study as a clinical study received 
unfavourable opinion from the Health Research Authority (HRA) in the ethical 
application phase. The main feedback from the HRA Committee who were 
responsible for reviewing the application stated there was a concern over participants’ 
wellbeing if they are approached at the routine initial assessment stage (before being 
put on a waiting list for treatment), especially if there was potential for increasing or 
aggravating their symptoms; and that a therapist should be present at all times during 
a participants’ time in the study in case of any distress or upset caused, as the protocol 
provided for the lead researcher to manage instances of any distress was not deemed 
sufficient. The Committee also stated that a pilot of the study should be carried out on 
service users before resubmitting the ethics application for a full Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) Review. I felt that any potential negative impact of asking 
participants to imagine and describe future events related to negative cue words were 
offset by asking them to recall an equal number of positively valenced events, but in 
the case of any distress caused, it was not practicable to have another therapist 
available for the full duration of the data collection phase.  
Given the limited time frame to complete the research and resubmit an ethics 
application for a full review, it was decided that a realistic amendment would be to 
use a student sample. The aim of this was to minimise potential risks whilst 
investigating the same topic in a (necessarily) shorter time frame. The University 
ethics process is typically shorter than completing NHS ethics, and there is an 
accessible credit pool where Psychology students are required to earn a certain 
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amount of course credits as an incentive to take part. Using this pool of students also 
meant that a base was more readily available for data collection and there was no need 
for lone working and/or home visits – another ethical concern when recruiting from 
NHS services within limited clinic space; therefore changing the sample source was 
seen as a more viable option. As described previously there is evidence that using an 
analogue sample with subclinical levels of depression is an appropriate comparison 
for clinical depression, the generalisability of findings needs to take the difference 
between the two into account. For instance, there is also evidence that self-report 
measures and clinician rated measures of depression are not in fact equivalent, and 
they both provide unique information relevant to clinical prognosis (Uher et al., 
2012).  
The fact that the sample and therefore focus (and possible impact) of the 
present study had to be changed from a clinical sample to an analogue one left me 
feeling quite disheartened in the early phases. I had initially found my interest drawn 
to a subject area (future-directed thinking) I was not familiar with at all but felt it was 
worth contending with a completely new knowledge and theory base in order to 
contribute to clinical research in depressive disorders, which was my primary aim. As 
a result of the unexpected obstacles, I was able to reflect on the process of recruiting 
from clinical services and the associated ethics of doing so, which I hope will prepare 
me for future research experiences. If I had the chance to redo this research, I would 
do a number of things differently. Firstly, I feel my unfamiliarity with the NHS ethics 
procedure meant I for one underestimated the time it would take to navigate through 
this process, and two produced an application that was not as robust or detailed as it 
should have been. Now that I have had this experience I feel I would benefit from 
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better preparation in future. Secondly, my experience of trying to recruit a clinical 
sample encouraged me to reflect on the dichotomy between how the NHS perceives 
research as vital in transforming and advancing services and improve outcomes and 
quality of care; and the reality of achieving this in busy NHS services. I had 
approached notoriously busy primary care psychological therapies services which are 
known for their high targets on frequency of client contacts. My rationale for 
approaching such services was purely that they specialise in treating depression, 
however I realise in retrospect that this meant I did not consider their likely reduced 
availability in being able to accommodate my research. Again, if I were to 
hypothetically redo this research, I would firstly consider selecting alternative 
recruitment sources, for instance there are charitable organisations for depression 
which may also be suitable. I would also take the time to visit the services in person at 
the preliminary stages in order to improve the interface between the researcher and 
clinician, emphasise the benefits of the research in terms of its possible clinical 
impact, and provide reassurance regarding the burden to the service, as qualitative 
research has indicated that services and clinicians are more reluctant to support a 
study if they do not feel it is important, due to the time and effort required (Bucci et 
al., 2015).  
 Study Design and Associated Data Analysis 
 A 2 x 2 mixed model design was chosen, where two groups were chosen on 
the basis of cut off scores on a self-report depression measure. Another way of 
approaching the research questions would have been to use a correlational design, 
investigating the relationships between the variables of pre-experiencing and elevated 
depression. Although this was considered, there were several reasons why this design 
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was not chosen. Firstly, the final sample size was not considered large enough to 
sufficiently power a correlational design, where it was calculated a minimum of 85 
participants were required. Not only was it difficult to gain that many participants 
given the lack of take up from advertising around the university, but it was also not 
feasible in terms of the time frame available for data collection. For instance, each 
participant is expected to be in the study for approximately one hour, and following 
this, it took on average and hour and a half per participant to transcribe their responses 
to the Future-Directed Autobiographical Interview and subsequently code this data for 
internal and external details. In addition to this, in order to analyse the data to 
sufficiently investigate the research questions, a correlational design would mean a 
large number of correlational analyses (minimum 64) would need to be carried out, 
which was deemed a rather inelegant way of approaching data analysis.  
Dual Role – Clinical and Research 
 Another aspect for reflection was my position as both a Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist and Researcher, in terms of the overall research process and more 
specifically on the relationship with participants during the data collection phase. 
Although the empirical study did not involve a clinical sample and thus the 
boundaries are less blurred, the study did involve participants thinking about 
potentially negative future events, which are typically based in worries and concerns 
they have (offset by asking for an equal number of positive experiences). I was 
mindful that engaging in a discussion about fears and worries with somebody you 
know is also a mental health clinician might create a slightly different dynamic 
compared to having the same discussion with somebody who is not trained in a 
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clinical field. As a result of this, I ensured I kept a neutral, nonreactive demeanour as 
much as possible when participants were describing future events.  
In a more general sense, conducting this research encouraged me to think 
about my role as a scientist-practitioner. The scientist-practitioner model provides a 
framework within which clinicians are constantly allowing empirical research to 
influence their practice and vice versa. There is a greater emphasis and scrutiny in the 
current financially constrained NHS climate for clinical psychologists to demonstrate 
their unique skills in comparison to other, perhaps less costly, clinically trained 
professionals. Carrying out this research alongside my clinical work made me 
question the feasibility of adhering to these expectations. The data collection and 
subsequent transcription and coding of event descriptions in the methodology utilised 
for the empirical study proved to be much more time consuming and demanding than 
I had initially anticipated, in my naivety to this research area and associated methods. 
At a point half way through I found myself feeling increasingly anxious and stressed, 
which in turn further impacted my ability to carry out the required tasks in a timely 
manner. Through the use of research supervision, I was able to reflect on how these 
stress-induced thoughts were inhibiting me from taking a longer-sighted view of my 
role as a scientist-practitioner. As a qualified psychologist, I am unlikely to face such 
stringent deadlines, there is generally greater flexibility in the whole research process, 
and I am more likely to be in a position to receive help from other more junior 
members of staff in some of the research tasks – such as data collection, transcribing 
and coding for instance.  
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Impact 
 Theoretical Implications   
In Chapters 1 and 2, it was implied that future thinking is related to the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter et al., 2007), which suggests 
that individuals draw on episodic memory of events which are recombined and 
elaborated to simulate possible future happenings. The implication of this might be 
that as people with depression have commonly been found to have more negative 
beliefs about the self, others and the world based on their past experiences, they are 
likely to think about the future in similar ways. However, the findings of the present 
study highlighted that rather than differences in the types of thoughts experienced by 
people with elevated depression, there were differences in anticipatory emotions. This 
finding is interesting, because predominant cognitive models of depression 
emphasise, as noted above, the powerful role that cognition plays in affecting mood 
(Beck, 1967; Coombs, Coleman & Jones, 2002), that is, faulty cognition leads to 
depressed mood.  
Miranda and Persons (1988) mood-state hypothesis, proposed that 
dysfunctional beliefs are vulnerability factors for depression but that reporting of the 
beliefs varies with current mood state, so when in a negative mood state, people 
readily endorse dysfunctional beliefs, but when they are in a positive mood state, 
people do not report dysfunctional beliefs. Teasdale & Russell (1983) support the 
view that perhaps mood states precede dysfunctional thinking. Here, state-dependent 
learning is considered, where information learned in one state is usually inaccessible 
in other states becomes accessible once the original state is reintroduced. When 
applied to past thinking, memories of negative personal episodes would tend to have 
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been originally encoded in the context of an unhappy mood state and would therefore 
be more accessible when the context of a similar mood state prevailed than in the 
context of a dissimilar, happy, mood state (and the opposite for positive memories). 
The increased accessibility of negative memories during negative mood states (and 
decreased accessibility of positive memories) may mean that a person is likely to 
make gloomy predictions about the future when depressed (Teasdale & Russell, 
1983), which fits with Schacter et al.’s (2007) constructive episodic simulation 
hypothesis but taking a more emotion focused that belief focused stance. The negative 
mood states may also lead to reduced expectations of success for the outcome of 
coping behaviours, and thus reduce motivation to take action to reduce depression.  
Furthermore, Bower (1981) found that participants in whom angry moods had 
been induced tended to give angry interpretations of ambiguous pictures and angry 
free associations to stimulus words, whereas subjects in induced happy moods tended 
to give happy interpretations and free associations. The suggestion of mood states 
precipitating dysfunctional cognitions does not necessarily argue against popular 
cognitive theories if we distinguish between negative mood and clinical depression 
(Miranda, Persons & Byers, 1990).  
In their study, Miranda et al., (1990) assessed current mood states and 
dysfunctional thinking in a sample of clinically depressed participants. They found 
that thinking was more dysfunctional when mood was at its worst, and less 
dysfunctional when mood was at its best. Thinking about this in the context of the 
results of both the systematic review in Chapter 1 and the empirical study in Chapter 
2, people with subclinical levels or of depressive symptomology or from non-clinical 
community and student samples did not demonstrate different cognitive 
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representations of future events, in comparison to those from clinical samples. It may 
be that people with elevated, but subclinical depression, so more akin to mild low 
mood, benefit less from thinking about the future because their negative mood state 
may prime dysfunctional interpretations or beliefs even about positive events (as they 
have lower expectations about the success of the positive events actually happening to 
them or anticipate more obstacles to get the desired outcome), but it is the activation 
of such beliefs (through environmental triggers for one instance) that may be what 
leads to worsening of low mood and development of clinical depression and thus 
differences in cognitive representations of future thoughts. 
Clinical Implications 
The findings of this study have implications for clinical practice, particularly 
in settings where low to moderate depressive symptomology is common, rather than 
severe. At the outset, it was suggested that understanding more about prospection and 
pre-experiencing in depression and the related here and now emotional response may 
highlight barriers that could impact upon the success of therapeutic outcomes. In the 
context of the stance that negative mood states prime dysfunctional thinking in low 
levels of depression, it may be that eliciting emotional expression in treatment 
sessions when thinking about goals for the future for example, may be important.  
There are differing theoretical perspectives about the importance of focusing 
on and experiencing feelings in psychotherapy (Coombes et al., 2002). Early 
psychodynamic theories emphasise the expression of emotion as a way of 
understanding an individual’s difficulties, however it has been argued that cognitive 
behavioural therapy tends to steer away from emotional experiencing in sessions in 
favour of focusing upon cognitive distortions as a way of reducing negative affect and 
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behaviour (Coombes et al., 2002). Teasdale & Barnard (1993) also highlight that there 
is difficulty distinguishing between an “intellectual belief” and “emotional belief,” as 
the cognitive model focuses on only one level of meaning. They give the example of 
the patient who reports they know logically they are not worthless, but they don’t 
believe it emotionally, arguably because of their negative mood state. If applied to 
future thinking, this may be “I want this nice event to happen but it doesn’t feel like it 
is going to.” If considered within the cognitive model, this would be considered the 
degree to which they believe in the dysfunctional thought, which many clinicians 
have found unconvincing, drawing upon a qualitative difference between the 
intellectual and emotional belief, arguing the emotional belief has greater impact on 
functionality (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). 
Cognitive behavioural therapy already targets prospection through its focus on 
goal setting and behavioural activation to make future change and promote 
engagement in future events. Feeling heightened negative emotions when thinking 
about future stressful and/or negative events and reduced expectations of the success 
of positive outcomes may mean more emphasis on emotional expression related to 
thinking about future goals is an important clinical aspect to focus on. Subsequently, 
problem solving and planning needs to take place prior to engaging in goal directed 
behaviours to help reduce some of these emotions. The finding that people with 
depression show less positive and more negative emotional response following 
prospection, and that they feel less happy and less relaxed when thinking about any 
kind of future event (irrespective of valence) may mean motivation to make change is 
compromised, by anticipating less benefit from making that change. So again, 
intervention may benefit from a more explicit focus on emotions related to and 
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benefits of future actions and/or change prior to attempting any behavioural activation 
type tasks.  
Future-directed therapy (FDT) has already been introduced as a way of 
alleviating depressive symptomology. Although it has components based in cognitive 
theory, it explicitly does not focus on assessing the accuracy or rationality of thought 
processes (Vilhauer et al., 2012). FDT hypothesised that when people feel, they have 
the power to thrive by creating a desired future state and obtain what is wanted. 
Psychological distress occurs when the perceived ability to move forward into a 
desired future state is hindered. If the ratio of attentional resources becomes 
disproportionately allocated in the direction of thinking about what is unwanted (for 
example obstacles to achieving positive outcomes as mentioned previously) this focus 
on the unwanted moves them away from a state of thriving and leads to distress. FDT 
focuses on emotions as indicators of thought processes rather than the other way 
round, and has been found effective in reducing depressive symptomology (Vilhauer 
et al., 2012).  
Personal Impact 
Elsewhere in this chapter I have reflected broadly on my role as an effective 
scientist-practitioner. In addition to the previous thoughts, the findings of this research 
have encouraged me to consider how I might adapt my own clinical practice when 
working with people with depression. My predominant treatment model is cognitive 
behaviour therapy, and I noticed how I could not recall the last time I spent a 
significant amount of time exploring emotions related to achieving goals for example, 
and reflected upon how this tends to take a backseat in favour of the more tangible 
and practical focus on specific strategies when I have worked within this framework 
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in previous settings. I found myself considering the feasibility of doing so in time and 
cost pressured services where the number of recommended sessions that can be 
offered to clients is becoming increasingly fewer with time, and ways in which I 
could accommodate this potentially helpful aspect in assisting therapeutic change. 
Conducting this research also encouraged me to think about alternative forms of 
therapy, such as the aforementioned FDT. I am always keen to learn new ways of 
managing distress in order to be the most effective practitioner I can be. Perhaps 
learning more about the FDT approach and further contributing to its evidence base as 
a development of this current piece of work could be a valuable avenue to explore in 
future.  
Dissemination 
 In order to achieve impact, it is important that the findings of this research are 
disseminated to appropriate forums. A short presentation of the empirical study has 
been disseminated to current trainees on the DClinPsy course at Royal Holloway 
University of London. This presentation included recommendations for future 
improvements and developments to investigating the research topic which current or 
upcoming Trainee Clinical Psychologists may wish to explore further. A target 
journal to submit the empirical study for publication is ‘Consciousness and 
Cognition,’ an international journal which focuses on a natural science approach to 
the issues of consciousness, voluntary control, and self. The rationale for choosing 
this particular journal is that the research topic is a good fit for their areas of focus and 
they have previously published many articles on future directed thinking. Given that 
the research topic is quite specific or niche, it is important to choose a journal based 
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on desired audience rather than how popular or far reaching it is. The journal accepts 
open access articles and is referenced in search databases too.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter considered the impact of this work as well as reflections on the 
processes involved in undertaking it. Although obstacles were faced in recruiting a 
clinical sample for the study which meant changing to a student population, this 
process enabled me to reflect on the challenges of conducting research within a busy 
NHS and how to adapt my practice and expectations in future. I also developed 
confidence in my ability to conduct research effectively and am pleased with the final 
result. A series of relevant clinical implications of the findings from this work have 
been discussed, and to conclude, whilst the present contribution to the research topic 
has some limitations, it provides useful insight into how people feel in the here and 
now when they think about the future, and how elevated depression may influence 
this. Furthermore, it provides a basis for expanding the design into clinical 
populations to determine if the results are generalisable before further contributing to 
our theoretical understanding of depression and adapting subsequent future thinking 
or goal based interventions to facilitate more emotional expression. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Search Strings for Systematic Review 
 
Database Search Terms Number of Papers 
Found 
PsychINFO TOPIC: (future 
thinking) OR TOPIC: 
(future-thinking) OR 
TOPIC: (future-directed 
thinking) OR TOPIC: 
(thinking about the 
future) OR TOPIC: 
(prospection) AND 
TOPIC: (specific*) AND 
TOPIC: (depress*) OR 
TOPIC: (anx*) OR 
TOPIC: (schizophrenia) 
OR TOPIC: (bipolar) 
OR TOPIC: (PTSD) OR 
TOPIC: (posttraumatic 
stress disorder) OR 
TOPIC: (trauma) 
216 
Web of Science TOPIC: (future 
thinking) OR TOPIC: 
(future-thinking) OR 
TOPIC: (future-directed 
thinking) OR TOPIC: 
(thinking about the 
future) OR TOPIC: 
(prospection) AND 
TOPIC: (specific*) AND 
TOPIC: (depress*) OR 
TOPIC: (anx*) OR 
TOPIC: (schizophrenia) 
OR TOPIC: (bipolar) 
OR TOPIC: (PTSD) OR 
TOPIC: (posttraumatic 
stress disorder) OR 
TOPIC: (trauma) 
507 
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Appendix 2 Quality Rating Tool for Systematic Review 
1. Is the hypothesis, aim, objective of the study clearly described? The hypotheses, 
aims, and objectives must be explicitly formulated. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
2. Are all primary outcomes to be measured clearly described in the Introduction or 
Methods section? If the main outcomes are first mentioned in the results section, 
the answer should be no. If all primary outcomes are described in the 
Introduction, the answer is yes. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
3. Are the characteristics of the participants included in the study clearly described? 
For studies involving clinical samples, the inclusion and exclusion criteria (in 
terms of age, sex, diagnosis) should be given as well as the deﬁnition and the 
source for the control participants should be provided. For studies involving 
nonclinical samples, an operational deﬁnition of dysphoric depressive state 
should be provided. For all studies, demographic information should be provided 
(age, sex) as well as depressive symptom severity levels for each group 
(categorical study designs) or the total sample (dimensional study designs). 
Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
4. Were the subjects asked to participate in the study representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The study must identify the source 
population for patients and describe how the patients were selected. Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
5. Were those subjects who were prepared to participate representative of the entire 
population from which they were recruited? The proportion of those asked who 
agreed should be stated. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
6. Were the participants recruited from the same population? Participants should be 
selected from the same population. For example, all patients should be recruited 
from the sample hospital, undergraduate students should be from the same 
university. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
7. Were study participants recruited over the same time? Participants should have 
been recruited within a specified time window. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 
0=Unable to determine. For a study which does not specify the time period over 
which patients were recruited, the question should be answered as unable to 
determine. Studies must be <3 years for yes, if >3 years then no. 
8. Are the tasks and measures clearly described? The tasks and measures should be 
explicitly described with examples of the stimulus materials used. Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO. 
9. Were the main outcome measures used valid and reliable? The validity and 
reliability of the task and measures should be proved by referring to relevant prior 
work or by providing data supporting the use of the task to measure the key 
constructs (interpretation bias, depression). All primary outcomes need to be 
valid and reliable for yes. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
10. Was the participants’ engagement with the experimental task(s) assessed? Did the 
study report checks for outliers, RTs from errors discarded, and/or exclusion of 
individuals not conforming to the task instructions? Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 
0=Unable to determine. 
11. Did the study consider principal confounders (e.g., such as race, sex, marital 
status/family, age, SES (income or class), education) and was there adequate 
adjustment for confounding in the analyses from which the main findings were 
drawn? Studies need to examine potential group differences on potentially 
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confounding variables (when utilizing a categorical design) or assess correlations 
with depression severity and potentially confounding variables (when utilizing a 
dimensional design). If the effect of the main confounders was not investigated or 
no adjustment was made in the final analyses the question should be answered as 
no. If no significant difference between groups or no relation between confounder 
and key variable, then YES. Scoring: 2=YES, 1=PARTIALLY, 0=NO, 0=Unable 
to determine. 
12. Were the statistical tests used to assess the main outcomes appropriate? The 
statistical techniques used must be appropriate to the data. If no tests done but it 
would have been appropriate to do then the item should be scored as no. Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
13. Are the main findings of the study clearly described? Simple outcome data 
(including denominators and numerators) should be reported for all major 
findings so that the reader can check the major analyses and conclusions. 
Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
14. Does the study provide estimates of the random variability in the data for the 
main outcomes? In non-normally distributed data the inter-quartile range of 
results should be reported. In normally distributed data the standard error, 
standard deviation or confidence intervals should be reported. Scoring: 1=YES, 
0=NO. 
15. Have actual probability values been reported (e.g. 0.035 rather than <0.05) for the 
main outcomes except where the probability value is less than 0.001? Scoring: 
1=YES, 0=NO. 
16. Were withdrawals and drop-outs reported in terms of numbers and/or reasons? 
Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
17. If any of the results of the study were based on “data dredging”, was this made 
clear? Any analyses that had not been planned at the outset of the study should be 
clearly indicated. Retrospective analyses should be rated as ‘no’, prospective as 
‘yes’. Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO, 0=Unable to determine. 
18. Did the study have sufficient power to detect a clinically important effect where 
the probability value for a difference being due to chance <5%? The study needs 
to report a power analysis (calculating the required sample size given an effect 
size and desired power). Scoring: 1=YES, 0=NO. 
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Appendix 3 Individual Quality Ratings for Papers included in Systematic Review  
 
AUTHORS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
Addis, Hach & 
Tippett (2016) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Anderson, 
Boland & 
Garner (2016) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Belcher & 
Kangas (2014) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Blix & 
Brennan 
(2011) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Boelen, 
Huntjens & 
van den Hout 
(2014) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Boulanger, 
Lejeune & 
Blairy (2013) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Brown, Addis, 
Romano, 
Marmar, 
Bryant, Hirst 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
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AUTHORS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
& Schacter 
(2013) 
D'Argembeau, 
Raffard & Van 
der Linden 
(2008) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Dickson & 
Bates (2006) 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Dickson & 
Moberly 
(2013) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Dickson, 
Moberly, 
Hannon & 
Bates (2009) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Hach, Tippet 
& Addis 
(2014) 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
King, 
Williams, 
MacDougall, 
Ferris, Smith, 
Ziolkowski & 
McKinnon 
(2011) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
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AUTHORS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
King, 
MacDougall, 
Ferris, 
Herdman & 
McKinnon 
(2011) 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Kleim, 
Graham, 
Fihosy, Stott 
& Ehlers 
(2014)  1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Maccallum & 
Bryant (2011) 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
MacLeod & 
Cropley 
(1995) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Parlar, Lee, 
Haqquee, 
Rhooms, 
Lanius & 
McKinnon 
(2016)  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Robinaugh, 
Lubin, Babic 
& McNally 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
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AUTHORS Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
(2013)  
Robinaugh & 
McNally 
(2013) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Szollosi, 
Pajkossy & 
Racsmany 
(2015) 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Vincent, 
Boddana, & 
MacLeod 
(2004) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Williams, 
Ellis, Tyers, 
Healy, Rose & 
MacLeod 
(1996) 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.5 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
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Appendix 4 Participant Information Sheet 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
 
 
Study Title:  
 
Pre-experiencing the Future and mood 
 
Brief Summary: 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study about how people feel when they 
think about the future. 
 
 
 
Why are we doing this research? 
 
This research project will investigate how people feel in the here and now when they think 
about things that could happen in the future. Specifically, we want to see if people who are 
anxious or depressed have a different kind of experience when they think about the future 
compared to others who feel less anxious or depressed.  
 
Why am I being asked to take part and what does it involve? 
 
You are being asked to take part because we are looking for a group of 85 students to 
complete the study. For the study, the researcher will meet with you for around 1 hour. During 
that time, you will be asked to fill in two short questionnaires that ask how much you 
experience different feelings of anxiety and depression. 
 
You will then be shown some words on a screen and asked to think about and describe things 
that you might experience in the future that the word makes you think of. This will be audio-
recorded for later analysis. After thinking about each future event, you will be asked to fill out 
a brief 6 item questionnaire rating how you felt when thinking of each event. The whole study 
should last no more than 1 hour. We will also ask you for some demographic information, 
such as your gender, age and ethnicity. All the information you provide will be anonymous 
and kept confidential.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
Although there may not be any direct benefit of taking part, your participation will help us 
understand and possibly aid future treatment adaptations in anxiety and/or depression.  
 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
You will need to be available for around 1 hour to take part in the study, however the 
researcher will arrange to meet you at a convenient location on campus.  
 
The questions asked in the study are not expected to be distressing, however you will be 
thinking of things that might produce momentary changes in how you feel, but this will be both 
positive and negative. The measures have been used lots of times before with different 
groups of people, including those who are depressed and/or anxious. You are in control of 
what events you choose to describe for this part of the task, and should you feel distressed 
you can stop at any time, and there will be someone available for you to speak to. You can 
also choose to withdraw from the study at any time. 
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Further Information 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation is voluntary so it is your decision. If you decide to take part now but later change 
your mind, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give reason. 
If you do choose to take part, you will be given course credit. We anticipate recruiting around 
85 people. 
 
What will happen if I do choose to take part? 
 
You will be asked by the researcher to confirm whether you would like to take part after you 
have had time to read this sheet. If you are happy to take part in the study, we will arrange a 
time to meet and you will be asked to sign a consent form before the study begins as 
described above.  
 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All of the information collected will be made anonymous. The information you provide will be 
coded with a Participant Identification Number so you cannot be identified from it. All data will 
be kept securely according to the Data Protection Act 1998. The research team has a duty of 
confidentiality to you as a research participant.  If you score highly on the anxiety or 
depression measures the researcher will advise you to contact your GP but will not break 
confidentiality unless there are clear signs that you are at risk of harming yourself. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The overall results of the study may be published in a peer-reviewed journal. The results will 
be in the form of average scores across the group of participants as a whole rather than any 
individual responses. You can also request a copy of a summary of the results of this study. 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This study is being conducted as part of a doctoral programme at Royal Holloway University 
of London, and they are funding the research.  
 
Who to contact if you have any questions at any time in your involvement in this study: 
 
Gurveen Ranger (Trainee Clinical Psychologist and Chief Investigator) – 
gurveen.ranger.2015@live.rhul.ac.uk  
Professor Andy MacLeod (Academic Supervisor) – a.macleod@rhul.ac.uk  
 
Royal Holloway University of London, Egham Hill, Egham, TW20 0EX. 
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Appendix 5 Ethics Application and Approval Email 
 
Ethics Review Details 
You have chosen to submit your project to the REC for review. 
Name: Ranger, Gurveen (2015) 
Email: PCVA066@live.rhul.ac.uk 
Title of research project or grant: Pre-experiencing the future in anxiety and depression 
Project type: Royal Holloway postgraduate research project/grant 
Department: Psychology 
Academic supervisor: Andy MacLeod 
Email address of Academic Supervisor: a.macleod@rhul.ac.uk 
Funding Body Category: No external funder 
Funding Body: 
Start date: 15/05/2017 
End date: 29/06/2018 
 
Research question summary: 
This research project aims to ask whether people with higher anxiety and depression symptoms show differences in 
their ability to preexperience 
the future, in comparison to those with lower anxiety/depression scores. 
Research question 1 - Are higher anxiety and depression scores in the whole sample correlated with lower scores on 
the pre-experiencing 
measure (PCQ). 
Research Question 2 - Do those higher on the depression measure show more positive attenuation, thus reduced 
pre-experiencing scores 
in response to positive cues. 
Research Question 3 - Do those who score higher on the anxiety measure show more negative potentiation, thus 
higher pre-experiencing 
scores in response to negative cues. 
Research method summary: 
This study will use a correlational design. 
Participants will be asked to complete the PHQ-9, GAD-7 anxiety and depression measures. They will also be asked 
to describe how they 
are feeling in the moment (E.g. happy, relaxed, tense, sad) and rate the intensity of these emotions on a 7-point 
scale. 
Participants will then begin a future-directed Autobiographical Interview: 
1. They will be presented with 8 cue words in total (2 positive with the time specified as next few weeks; 2 positive 
with time specified as 
next few years; and 2 negative for the next few weeks; 2 negative for next few years) in a random order – one at a 
time. Cue words will be 
taken from existing research e.g. Williams et al., (1996). Positive cue words include: Successful, smile, gift, relaxed, 
compliment. Negative 
cue words include: Danger, mistake, angry, tears, guilty. 
2. For each cue word on screen, the participant will be instructed to orally describe (for up to 3 minutes) in detail a 
novel, specific account of 
a future event related to the cue word in front of them, from a field perspective. a. They may be prompted twice for 
more detail using a 
standard script of “what else happens on that day” and “can you tell me a little more about that” 
3. Following the description, participants will be asked to rate the phenomenological characteristics of the imagined 
event using the adapted 
version of the PCQ. 
4. Participants will then move onto the next cue word, until all 8 have been completed. We will include a verbal 
fluency task to enable us to 
examine whether results are linked to general verbal fluency. 
The Autobiographical Interview is expected to take approximately 45 minutes’ maximum, and coded according to a 
standard procedure. 
Risks to participants 
Ethics Review Details 
You have chosen to submit your project to the REC for review. 
Name: Ranger, Gurveen (2015) 
Email: PCVA066@live.rhul.ac.uk 
Title of research project or grant: Pre-experiencing the future in anxiety and depression 
Project type: Royal Holloway postgraduate research project/grant 
Department: Psychology 
Academic supervisor: Andy MacLeod 
Email address of Academic Supervisor: a.macleod@rhul.ac.uk 
Funding Body Category: No external funder 
Funding Body: 
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Start date: 15/05/2017 
End date: 29/06/2018 
Does your research involve any of the below? 
Children (under the age of 16), 
No 
Participants with cognitive or physical impairment that may render them unable to give informed consent, 
No 
Participants who may be vulnerable for personal, emotional, psychological or other reasons, 
Yes 
Participants who may become vulnerable as a result of the conduct of the study (e.g. because it raises sensitive 
issues) or as a result of 
what is revealed in the study (e.g. criminal behaviour, or behaviour which is culturally or socially questionable), 
No 
Participants in unequal power relations (e.g. groups that you teach or work with, in which participants may feel 
coerced or unable to 
withdraw), 
No 
Participants who are likely to suffer negative consequences if identified (e.g. professional censure, exposure to 
stigma or abuse, damage to 
professional or social standing), 
No 
Details, 
We will be asked participants to think of possible negative events that could happen in the future, which may be 
distressing. However, 
participants will be in control of what they choose to think of, and we will also be asking them to generate an equal 
number of positive 
events. 
We would be seeking informed written consent, as well as providing a detailed information sheet on the project 
outlining the purpose of the 
study, what will be expected in terms of participation, confidentiality of data, and the right to withdraw. A standard 
statement on the 
information sheet given to all participants will advise them to discuss with their GP if they have concerns about their 
mood. A protocol will be 
developed to manage distress should this arise. 
Design and Data 
Does your study include any of the following? 
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and/or informed consent at the 
time?, 
No 
Is there a risk that participants may be or become identifiable?, 
No 
Is pain or discomfort likely to result from the study?, 
No 
Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety, or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks 
encountered in normal 
life?, 
No 
Does this research require approval from the NHS?, 
No 
If so what is the NHS Approval number, 
Are drugs, placebos or other substances to be administered to the study participants, or will the study involve 
invasive, intrusive or 
potentially harmful procedures of any kind?, 
No 
Will human tissue including blood, saliva, urine, faeces, sperm or eggs be collected or used in the project?, 
No 
Will the research involve the use of administrative or secure data that requires permission from the appropriate 
authorities before use?, 
No 
Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?, 
Yes 
Is there a risk that any of the material, data, or outcomes to be used in this study has been derived from ethically-
unsound procedures?, 
No 
Details, 
Participants will be entered into a prize draw for 1 x £40; 2 x £20 & 2 x £10 Amazon Vouchers. 
Risks to the Environment / Society 
Will the conduct of the research pose risks to the environment, site, society, or artifacts?, 
No 
Will the research be undertaken on private or government property without permission?, 
No 
Will geological or sedimentological samples be removed without permission?, 
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No 
Will cultural or archaeological artifacts be removed without permission?, 
No 
Details, 
Risks to Researchers/Institution 
Does your research present any of the following risks to researchers or to the institution? 
Is there a possibility that the researcher could be placed in a vulnerable situation either emotionally or physically (e.g. 
by being alone with 
vulnerable, or potentially aggressive participants, by entering an unsafe environment, or by working in countries in 
which there is unrest)?, 
No 
Is the topic of the research sensitive or controversial such that the researcher could be ethically or legally 
compromised (e.g. as a result of 
disclosures made during the research)?, 
No 
Will the research involve the investigation or observation of illegal practices, or the participation in illegal practices?, 
No 
Could any aspects of the research mean that the University has failed in its duty to care for researchers, participants, 
or the environment / 
society?, 
No 
Is there any reputational risk concerning the source of your funding?, 
No 
Is there any other ethical issue that may arise during the conduct of this study that could bring the institution into 
disrepute?, 
No 
Details, 
Declaration 
By submitting this form, I declare that the questions above have been answered truthfully and to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, and 
that I take full responsibility for these responses. I undertake to observe ethical principles throughout the research 
project and to report any 
changes that affect the ethics of the project to the University Research Ethics Committee for review. 
Certificate produced for user ID, PCVA066 
Date: 15/05/2017 11:05 
Signed by: Ranger, Gurveen (2015) 
Digital Signature: 
Certificate dated: 5/15/2017 12:04:37 PM 
Files uploaded: Student Consent Form V3, 24.03.17.doc 
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Appendix 6 PHQ-9 
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Appendix 7 GAD-7 
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Appendix 8 ‘In the moment’ Mood Ratings Questionnaire 
 
Participant Identification Number:  
MOOD RATING SCALES 
Title of Project: Pre-experiencing the Future 
Name of Researcher: Gurveen Ranger 
 
Please circle the number that best applies to how you are feeling 
 
Right now I feel…. 
 
1. Happy 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. Relaxed 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. Anxious 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
4. Sad 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
Completely 
Completely 
Completely 
Not at all 
Completely 
Not at all 
Not at all 
Not at all 
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Appendix 9 Protocol and Cue Words 
 
 PROTOCOL 
Title of Project: Pre-experiencing the Future 
Name of Researcher: Gurveen Ranger 
 
1. “Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.  We are interested in how 
people feel in the here-and-now when they imagine things that might happen in 
the future”. 
a. Check participant understands this concept and that they have read the 
Participant Information Sheet – answer any questions they have.  
b. Collect written and signed consent form.  
 
2. “Great, let’s start with some simple information about you.” 
a. Do demographics questionnaire 
b. Collect current mood rating using 7-point scales.  
 
3. “Thank you. Now let’s begin with the main part of the study” (Autobiographical 
Interview) You will see a single word on the screen, and I want you to use the 
word to help you to imagine a specific event that might realistically occur to you 
in the future.  Try to think of a specific event, one that happens in a particular 
place and in a particular time, and also not just something that has happened to 
you in the past. The event does not have to specifically involve the word, which is 
just there as a prompt”.  
 
“For each event, you will also be given a time-period, so you will be asked to 
imagine something that may occur either in the next few weeks, or in the next 
few years (up to 5 years from now).  Once you have thought of something I 
would like you to describe it out loud in as much detail as you can.  When 
describing it try to be specific, as if you were there at the time.  I will give you 
up to 3 minutes to do that and I will be recording what you say.  After you 
have finished describing an event I will ask you to do some ratings on it”.  I 
will ask you to do that a number of times, using new cue words each time.” 
 
“It’s probably not something you have done before so I am going to give you a 
couple of practices goes at it” 
a. Check participant understands what they need to do. 
b. Practice 
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c. Proceed with cue words, timed by 3 minutes, and then present with 
Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire & Mood Rating 
Questionnaire after each description.  
i. Can prompt up to two occasions with “can you tell me more about 
that…” 
  
(Shown on computer screen with three-minute timer) 
 
DANGER 
Next few weeks 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
WIN 
Next few weeks 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
TRAITOR 
Next few years 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
GIFT 
Next few years 
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(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
MISTAKE 
Next few weeks 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
COMPLIMENT 
Next few weeks 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
INJURY 
Next few years 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
 
SUCCESS 
Next few years 
 
(At end of three minutes: Thank you now please complete this questionnaire – PCQ) 
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4. “Thank you, now I would be grateful if you could complete some questionnaires 
looking at your mood, by circling the number that you think most applies to you.” 
a. PHQ-9 & GAD 
 
5. Thank you. I would now just like you to complete a brief task, where I give you a 
letter of the alphabet and ask you to come up with as many words beginning 
with that letter as possible.  Don’t use the same word with different endings, for 
example, give and giving, and try to avoid proper nouns like names of places or 
people.  I am going to do that with three different letters. 
a. Administer Verbal Fluency Task 
 
6. That is the end of the study, thank you for taking part. Do you have any 
questions or concerns? 
a. Take the time to address any questions or concerns participants might 
have at this stage 
b. Provide participant with debrief sheet 
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Appendix 10 Phenomenological Characteristics Questionnaire  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE – 
FUTURE VERSION 
Below is a list of questions about the characteristics associated with your 
imagined future events. Circle only one response, and please answer 
honestly. Your answers are confidential.  
 
Please indicate how much you agree with each statement by choosing a 
response between 1 and 7: 
 
1. When imagining the event, I feel as though I am experiencing it 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. When imaging the event, I feel that I travel forward to the time 
when it would happen 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. When imagining the event, I feel the emotions I would feel if the 
event occurred 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. The event was vivid 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. The event was difficult to imagine 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. The emotions I have when I think about the event are 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Completely 
Not at all Completely 
Not at all Completely 
Not at all Completely 
Extremely 
Negative 
Extremely 
Positive 
Not at all Completely 
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Appendix 11 Verbal Fluency Task 
VERBAL FLUENCY TASK 
Title of Project: Pre-experiencing the Future 
F A S 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
TOTAL: TOTAL: TOTAL: 
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Appendix 12 Feedback from Pilot  
1. How easy to follow (visually) is the online questionnaire package? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participant 1: 6 
Participant 2: 5 
Participant 3: 5 
Participant 4: 5 
Participant 5: 6 
 
Any other comments: 
Participant 2: Text not big enough 
Participant 4: The button at the bottom just has an arrow on it, I had to ask if 
that was the one to go to the next page or not – could be clearer 
Participant 5: The words could be bigger, especially on the cue words which 
are small on a big screen. | 
 
2. How easy to follow (technologically) is the online questionnaire package? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participant 1: 6 
Participant 2: 6 
Participant 3: 6 
Participant 4: 5 
Participant 5: 6 
 
Any other comments: 
None  
 
3. How easy to understand were the instructions for the main word cueing 
task? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participant 1: 4 
Participant 2: 6 
Participant 3: 5 
Participant 4: 5 
Participant 5: 4 
 
Not at all Very easy 
Not at all Very easy 
Not at all Very easy 
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Any other comments: 
Participant 1: I had to check if the event I was describing had to be completely  
new 
Participant 5: The instructions were quite long and I wasn’t completely clear if 
I could chose something similar to what has happened to me  
4. How did you find engaging in this study? 
Distressing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Participant 1: 1 
Participant 2: 1 
Participant 3: 1 
Participant 4: 1 
Participant 5: 2 
 
Interesting: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Participant 1: 5 
Participant 2: 5 
Participant 3: 5 
Participant 4: 6 
Participant 5: 6 
Enjoyable: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participant 1: 6 
Participant 2: 5 
Participant 3: 4 
Participant 4: 4 
Participant 5: 6 
 
Boring: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Participant 1: 1 
Participant 2: 1 
Participant 3: 1 
Participant 4: 2 
Participant 5: 2 
 
Not at all Very  
Not at all 
Very  
Not at all Very  
Not at all Very  
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Any other comments: 
Participant 1: It was quite hard to think of new events  
Participant 3: I found it hard to generate ideas but it was quite fun to do 
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Appendix 13 Consent Form 
 
Participant Identification Number:  
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Pre-experiencing the Future 
Name of Researcher: Gurveen Ranger 
I confirm that I have read the information sheet for the above study, and I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason. 
 
 
I understand that the information collected about me will be used to support 
other research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with other researchers. 
 
I understand that all data will be kept confidential, and that no personal identifying information 
will be disclosed in any reports on the project, or to any other party 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
            
Name of Participant  Date    Signature 
 
            
Name of Person  Date    Signature 
taking consent 
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Appendix 14 Debrief Form 
 
 
Participant Identification Number:  
DEBRIEF FORM 
Title of Project: Pre-experiencing the Future 
Name of Researcher: Gurveen Ranger 
Thank you for your participation in the above research study. Your involvement with this study 
has now ended and you will not be approached for any further information. You will only be 
contacted again if you have won the prize draw you were entered in at the start of your 
participation. 
If you need to talk to someone about any distress that may arise or have any concerns about 
your mental health, please contact your GP.  
Alternatively, please call: 
Samaritans – 08457 90 90 90 or 
Mind – 0300 123 3393. 
Results of this study will not include your name or any other identifying characteristics. The 
aim of this study was to understand more about the way people think about the future when 
they are feeling anxious and/or depressed. Specifically, we are interested in how anxiety and 
depression might affect the feelings you have in the here and now when thinking about future 
events. If people react with less positive feeling when they think about positive future events, 
and more negative feeling when they think about negative future events then both of those 
are likely to affect motivation to do things. We also want to understand more about how 
anxiety and depression affect these thoughts and feelings in different ways. You can request 
a copy of the summary of the research findings of this project (once it is completed) – please 
contact Gurveen Ranger at the email address/number below if you would like a copy.  
If you have any concerns or questions about your participation in this study or would like to 
withdraw your data, please do not hesitate to contact the research team on the contact details 
below. The researcher has written your participant number at the top of this sheet. As your 
data is identified only by this number, you will need to quote it if you would like your data to be 
removed at a later date, so please take care to make a note of the number. 
Researcher Contact Details: 
Gurveen Ranger (Trainee Clinical Psychologist & Chief Investigator) 
Email: gurveen.ranger.2015@live.rhul.ac.uk  
Professor Andy MacLeod (Academic Supervisor for project) 
Email: a.macleod@rhul.ac.uk  
 
 
